IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 1163

International Court of Justice

H1163-0002

# KARL DOENITZ

| Doc. No. | Exhibit No. | Doc. Book | SM Ref. | Date | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2887-PS | U.S.12 | | 254 | 8.11.45. | Offices and positions held by Defendant |
| D.436 | | | | 27.9.40 | Citation on promotion of Defendant to Vice Admiral (das Archiv 27.9.40 at p.550). |
| 1463-PS | | | | 1944 | Pocket-book of the Navy 1944. (Taschenbuch fur die Kriegsmarine 1944) |
| D.443 | | | | 17.12.43. | Speech by Defendant to Naval Officers at Weimar. (OKW/AWA/WF.B.Nr.156/44 Chefs Gekados) |
| D.640 | | | | 15.2.44. | Speech to Commanders in Chief. |
| 2878-PS | | | | 12.3.44. | Speech by Defendant on Heroes Day (Volkischer Beobachter 14.3.44. No. 74) (Das Archiv (March 1944) v. 120 pp. 928/9) |
| " | | | | 21.7.44. | Speech by Defendant to the Navy. (Das Archiv (July 1944) v.124, p. 260) |
| " | | | | 24.7.44. | Announcement of introduction of German salute for the Armed Forces. (Das Archiv (July 1944) v. 124, p. p.262) |
| D.444 | | | | 1.5.45. | Order of day and speech on death of Hitler. |
| C.126/C | G.B.45 | Bk.II | 1005 | 16.5.39. | Extract from Memo of C-in-C. |
| C.126/E | G.B.45 | Bk.II | 1005 | 2.8.39. | Extract from letter to the Fleet. |
| C.172 | | | | (before 16.7.39) | Order No. 1 for "Fall Weiss" |
| C.122 | G.B.82 | Bk.III | 1067 | 3.10.39. | Memorandum by Chief of the Naval Staff. |
| C.5 | G.B.83 | Bk.III | 1068 | 9.10.39. | Memorandum to Supreme Command of the Navy by Defendant. |
| C.151 | G.B.91 | Bk.III | 1091 | 30.3.40. | Operation order "Hartmut" |
| D.652 | | | | | Charts |
| D.641 | | | | 8.10.40. | (a) Extracts from official report on attacks on merchant shipping 3.9.39. to 1.9.40. |
| " | | | | 10.3.41. | (b) Extracts from official report on attacks on merchant shipping 1.9.40 to 28.2.41. |

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| Doc. No. | Exhibit No. | Doc. Book | S.M. Ref. | Date | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D. 641 | | | | 27.12.45. | (c) Statement concerning sinkings by U-boats 1939-1945. |
| D. 644 | | | | 2.7.45. | Report of sinking of "Sheaf Mead" |
| C. 191 | | | | 22.9.39. | Demands by Defendant on sinking of merchant ships. |
| C. 21 | | | | 1.1.40-26.1.40 | Extracts from file on intensification of U-boat warfare. |
| C. 118 | | | | 18.7.41. | Extract from file on sinking of merchant ships. |
| D. 642 | | | | | Order to Commanders |
| D. 423 | | | | 3.1.42. | Conversation between Hitler & Oshim |
| D. 446 | | | | 16.9.42. | Extract from B.d.U. War Diary. |
| D. 630 | | | | 17.9.42. | Order to all U-boat Commanders |
| " | | | | 17.9.42. | Extract from B.d.U. War Diary. |
| " | | | | 17.9.42. | Telegram from "Schacht" |
| " | | | | 20.9.42. | Telegram in reply to"Schacht" |
| D. 566 | | | | 27.11.45. | Affidavit by Oberleutnant zur See. |
| 382-PS | | | | 19.7.45. | Affidavit and statement by Korvetten Kapitan. |
| D. 645 | | | | 26.6.45. | Report on sinking of "Noreen Mary "<br>Extract from Log U.247<br>Comment on Log by B.d.U.<br>Affidavit by survivor. |
| D. 647 | | | | 28.9.42. | Extract from report on sinking of s.s. "Antonico" |
| D. 646 | | | | 11.3.43. | (a) Wireless talk by German naval reporter. |
| | | | | 12.1.43. | (b) Extract from War Diary of U.105 |
| 2098-PS= | | | | 25.2.38. | Decree relating to status of Supreme Commanders (R.G.B.1, 1938 Pt. I, p. 215) |
| D. 648 | | | | 2.1.46. | List of Hitler/Doenitz meetings. |
| C. 178 | | | | 11.2.43. | Memorandum by Naval War Staff |
| D. 649 | | | | 28.12.45. | Affidavit by Judge Advocate. |
| C. 158 | | | | 20.2.45. | Extract from minutes of Hitler Conference. |
| C. 171 | | | | 1.7.44. | Extract fromminutes of Hitler Conference. |
| C. 195 | | | | December 1944 | Memorandum signed by Defendant |
| D. 650 | | | | April 1945 | Orders issued by Defendant in April 1945. |

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DOCUMENT NO. 2887-PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

## OFFICES AND POSITIONS HELD BY DEFENDANT KARL DÖNITZ

It is hereby agreed that Karl Dönitz, a defendant in the action pending before the International Military Tribunal, was appointed or elected, as the case may be, to the positions, and held the offices entitled thereto during the time as set forth below:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1891 | Born in Berlin |
| 1910 | Joined the Navy as Seekadett |
| 1913 | Leutnant zur See |
| 1912-1916 | Kreuzer "Breslau" |
| 1915 | Oberleutnant zur See |
| 1916 | Transferred to Submarine Arm |
| 1918 | Taken prisoner |
| 1919 | Returned to Reichsmarine |
| 1928 | Korvettenkapitän |
| 1928-1930 | Commander of Destroyer Flotilla |
| 1930-1934 | Staff Officer, North Sea Station (Wilhelmshaven) |
| 1934 | Commander of EMDEN - training cruiser Fregattenkapitän |
| 1935 | Commander of Weddigne Submarine Flotilla<br>Kapitän zur See |
| 1936 | Rose to Commander of the Submarine Arm (Fuehrer d. Unterseeboote) |
| 1939 | Kommodore |
| 1939 | Konteradmiral<br>Befehlshaber (Commander-in-chief) der Unterseeboote |
| 1940 | Vizeadmiral |
| 1942 | Admiral |
| 1943 | (Jan 30) Grossadmiral, Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine succeeding Grossadmiral Raeder. (OKM)<br>Commander-in-chief of the Submarine Arm. |
| 1945 | (May 1) Staatsoberhaupt, Head of Germany (succeeding Hitler) |

## CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the above is true, this 8th day of November 1945.

/s/ Karl Dönitz
DEfendant

/s/ Kranzbuehler
Attorney for Defendant

(3308)

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Exhibit GB 183
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

EXTRACT FROM D. 436.

DAS ARCHIV 27.9.40 at p. 550

following announcement of promotion of KARL DÖNITZ to Vice-Admiral

At last, in Autumn 1935, after a successful command as captain of a foreign going cruiser, the then Fregattenkapitan is entrusted with the leadership of the first U-boats of the young navy. With the whole of his strength and energies, in the fulness of his wisdom and the power of his personality, he in these days undertakes the building up of the U-boat arm under his care. He does not do it from the office table, but arrays himself again in leather overalls and personally instructs his first captains and crews. In four years of untiring, and in the fullest sense of the word, uninterrupted work of training, he succeeds in developing the young U-boat arm personnel and material till it is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts. More than three million gross tons of sunken enemy shipping in only one year, achieved with only few boats, speak better than words of the services of this man.



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Exhibit GB 184
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. 1463-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

Diary for the Navy 1944
(Taschenbuch für die Kriegsmarine)

The Commander in Chief of
the German Navy, Admiral Doenitz.

"This war is a naval war and it
will be decided on the High Seas'
Admiral Doenitz.

Admiral Karl Doenitz was born in Berlin-Grunau on 16 September 1891, the son of an Engineer. He attended school in Berlin, Jena and Weimar. He entered the Imperial German Navy as a cadett on 1 April 1910 and was promoted to Lieutenant on 27 September 1913. As an ensign he was order d to the Little cruiser "Breslau". There he witnessed the outbreak of the first world war when he was in the Mediterranean sea. His experiences while on this cruiser which later became the "Midilli" of the Turkish navy he described in a little book published during the last war while he was a Lieutenant(jg). The title of the book was "The cruises of the 'Breslau' in the Black Sea". Doenitz was served as officer of the watch and adjutant received the Iron Cross 2nd class on 7 January 1915. For a time he was air observer near the Dardanelles and subsequently in charge of a naval aviation squadron near San Stefano. On 5 May 1916 he received the Iron Cross first class and in the fall of the year returned to Germany.

For a long time it had been the young officer's burning desire to become an officer on a submarine. This wish of the young lieutenant(jg) was fulfilled when he was ordered to submarine school 2 December 1916. This proved decisive in the life of this officer who indefatigably worked for the development of his weapon. Doenitz became at first officer of the watch on the Submarine "U 39" whose commanding officer, Lt(sg ) Forstman was one of the most successful submarine officers of the last war. Inspired with great daring, Forstmann was an officer who knew how to train agressive and responsible commanders. Doenitz always remembers with special gratitude the decisive influence of his former teacher. After an artillery course Doenitz on 1 March 1918 became Commander of "UC 25" and later "UB 68". With these boats he carried on successful warfare against merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean...

Lt.(jg) Doenitz placed himself at the disposal of the German Navy, dishonourably mutilated by the Versaillbs dictate, and aided in its reconstruction. He became a staff officer; he took over, during the attempted coup d'etat of Kaff, the command of the torpedo boat V5 which was usable but without a commander. For three years then he was commander of a torpedo boat, and became afterwards officer in charge of torpedo inspection and for another three years followed a responsible position with the Naval High Command. After one year's sea duty as navigation officer on the little cruiser "Nymphe" Doenitz became Chef of the first squadron of Torpedo boats newly built for the German Navy. In the fall of 1929 Doenitz was promoted to Lieutenant Commander. While Doenitz already earlier was making plans for the reconstruction of the German U-boat fleet his new position for the first time, gave him the opportunity to put down his experiences and suggestions in the form of memoranda written for his superiors and other influential personalities. During this time, already, the organizational plans and other prerequisites were created which made possible later on the rapid construction of new German U-boats. This was followed by another period during which he attended service schools and undertook sea duty. On one of his

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trips he went to India for several months. In 1934, he became Commanding Officer of the Light cruiser "Emden" which at that time undertook a cruise in the Indian Ocean.

When in 1935 Doenitz returned from this trip the Commander in Chief of the German Navy told him during a tour of inspection in Wilhelmshaven to his surprise that he was promoted to Chief of the U-boat flotilla "Weddingen". From this date, 27 September 1935, started the ceaseless construction of the new U-boats. At first two 250 ton boats were built. Doenitz lately promoted to Commander, elevated himself to his new task with passionate devotion and after untiring day and night work he was able in a very short time to present an extensive plan for the reorganization of U-boat warfare. Again "in the groove" Doenitz drilled and trained his young officers and even personally with pityless pace. The objective was to close a gap of 17 years during which no training took place, within a few months of tiresome work. Day after day, night after night, week after week he stood on the bridge of one of his U-boats in order to indoctrinate the men he was in charge of, by hard thorough training with the spirit of the men who manned the submarines during World War I. At the same time he collected new technical experiences and developed new improvements in the development of different submarine types. Doenitz knew no let down for himself. Regardless of weather, season, or time of day he went with the boats, instructed and trained their crews, and ordered them through thousands of miles in the Baltic and North Sea.....

One must recall, thereby, that after World War I a skillfully directed British propaganda created a general World opinion according to which submarines as a naval weapon were a thing of the past since superior defensive measures had been instituted especially the convoy system and in future naval engagements, submarines would be only of secondary importance. Commander Doenitz's opinion was dramatically opposite; "The massing of boats in convoy must be answered by massing of U-boats to attack the convoy". This maxime became the basis of his whole training program. This pack tactic which later became so famous was originated and tested at a time of complete peace. The cruises in the Baltic and North Sea were followed by the first Atlantic manouvers.....

Doenitz surrendered the command over the U-Boats only after the number of flotillas increased in order to devote himself to higher tasks of leadership. After beginning of the war, about 4 years after the first U-boats were commissioned the new weapon was in excellent condition and carried the stamp of a personality which was our ideal conservation between commander and frontline officer. Doenitz on 28 January 1939 was promoted Commodore of U-boats and entered the war with but 40 of his elite boats. They attacked immediately, within the first day. And at once this new weapon was a brilliant success. On 18 September 1939, Doenitz received a cluster to the Iron Cross 1st class. for his successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. When the position of "Leader of U-boats" was exchanged into that of "Commander" Doenitz was promoted to Rear Admiral on 1 October 1939.

Prien went to Scapa Flow. There was a fighter. He knew it and said over and over: "I was only the paw of the Big Lion" What I did, I could do because I was his disciple. All the "old guard" thought the same way and so did the commanding officers who returned with flags of victory flying, to their bases. The crew likewise was inspired by the old man. With unparalleled enthusiasm and matter of factness, they undertook every dangerous mission against the life-line of the enemy who controlled the sea, or control which they undermined, and brought again the terror of the U-boats to the Seven Seas to the surprise of the whole world. In an endless chain, the

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT NO. 1463-PS Contd.

U-boat Commanders reported success after success to their chief. Inspite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction program the Chief was what he always was and always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. A clear regard for the essential and the decisive, power to act and agressiveness are his main characteristics. Inspite of all his duties he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war.

Doenitz was in charge of the Naval operations Command Post situated on land. It is one of the strange and difficult characteristics of this form of Naval warfare that the Commander cannot be with his men, cannot make decisions on the spot but is forced to study the situation and give orders thousands of miles away from the actual location. The very strong ties between Doenitz and his men proved themselves in this case. They never felt, and that was said many times in mess halls and on enemy missions, that they had to make any of their difficult decisions alone. Tiny, brief answers following rendered radio reports proved that the Chief day and night was monitoring painstakingly their reports just as if he was with them, as if he stood in the bridge beside them.....

On 21 April 1940 Doenitz received the Knight's cross to the Iron Cross, a reward of the Führer, which put the unique accomplishments of this athletested officer in its true light. On September 1940, he was promoted to Vice Admiral, a year and a half later on 14 March 1942 he was promoted to Admiral a reward for the heavy damages inflicted on the new enemy, the U.S.A. On 30 January 1943 Doenitz received the Supreme Command over the German Navy from the Führer and concurrently was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet.

For the huge successes of the U-boats Doenitz received on 7 April 1943 in recognition of his unique achievements in U-boat warfare from the Führer personally as the 223 Soldier of the Wehrmacht , the Oakwreath to the Knights cross of the Iron Cross.

Even though the field of activity of the C in C of the German Navy has experienced a tremendous extent on his personal leadership in U-boat warfare and the personal care for his submarines, sailors, and for all units of the German Navy will also in the future remain the supreme law of all his action, Confidence merits confidence. The navy of Greater Germany will prove that it is worthy of its C in C.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1463-PS.

19 Nov. 1945.

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMAN, M/Sgt. 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1463-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMAN
M/Sgt. 33779426.

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Exhibit # GB 185
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

D.443

Naval High Command/General Service Dept/
Ref. No. 156/44/S.O. only

Top Secret

S.O. ONLY COPY NO. 91

BY HAND OF OFFICER ONLY.

Admiral of the Fleet Doenitz

Extracts from final address at the meeting of Commanders of the Navy in Weimar on Friday 17th December 1943.

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I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a matter of course for the soldier. But the whole importance, the whole weight of duty done, are only present when the heart and spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, obediently and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy, and t for this his conviction, his ideology, are indispensable. It is therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly, comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or every divergence, or unpreparedness, imply a weakness in all circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also nonsense to say, perhaps, that the soldier or the officer must have no politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives, he is the representative, the articulate exponent of this State. He must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this State.

We must travel this road from our deepest conviction. The Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this war if we take part in it with holy zeal, with all our fanaticism.

..... .....

Not I alone can do this, but it can only be done with the aid of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand, with Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the Navy as possible, so as to be able to fight and to strike. It does not matter to me who builds them.

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Exhibit USA 186
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

DOCUMENT NO. D-680.

Extract from a speech by the C-in-C Navy to the Commanders-in-Chief on 15. 2. 44.

"Although no word should really be lost over it, I feel myself bound to emphasize this point yet again. As officers we have the obligation to be the guardians of this unity of our people. Every disunity would also affect our troops. We have to guard this unity of our people, which in the National Socialist state has proved itself to a degree previously unimaginable. It is the duty of every officer to do so, and he who offends against this and thus against his people, must be smashed by me. I believe it to be necessary to train our young officer candidates, who have to be in a position of command after a very short training period particularly from this aspect. They must be trained militarily, but above all will also be trained in such a way that, as officers, they must be the unconditional guardians of our National Socialist State.

I always come back with very great joy from my visits to the men of the outpost boats, M.T.B's, destroyer and U-Boat forces, from troops who, compared with 1918, stand tower-high, because the unity of our people stands behind them. If this had not been the case the troops would long since have broken up. From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the state, the idle chatter that the officer is non-political is sheer nonsense."



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Exhibit GB 187
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

2878-PS

TRANSLATED EXTRACTS FROM DAS ARCHIV

1. (March 1944) v. 120, pp. 928-929

"Grossadmiral Doenitz speaks on Heroes' Day Wa. 12.3.44.

"The Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Grossadmiral Doenitz, spoke on Heroes' Day over the radio to the German people. His speech had the following content:

"German men and women!

".... What would have become of our country today, if the Fuehrer had not united us under National-Socialism! Split into parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, and lacking, as a defence, our present uncompromising world outlook, we would long since have succombed to the burdens of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our adversaries ...."

2. (July 1944) v. 124, p. 260

"Speech of Grossadmiral Doenitz to the Navy 21 July 1944

"Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts because of the criminal attempt which should have cost the life of our beloved Fuehrer. Providence wished it otherwise - watched over and protected our Fuehrer, and did not abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny.

"An insane small clique of generals which has nothing in common with our gallant army contemplated this murder in cowardly faithlessness committing the basest of treachery toward the Fuehrer and the German people. These scoundrels are only the instruments of our enemies whom they serve without character, with cowardice and misguided cleverness.

"The truth of the matter is that their folly is unlimited. They thought by ridding us of our Fuehrer they could free us from our hard but unavoidable fight for our destiny. But in their blind, timid stubbornness they did not see that their criminal deed would have led us into terrible chaos and delivered us defenseless to our enemies . Destruction of our people, enslavement of our men, hunger and nameless misery would have been the consequence. Our people would have experienced an indescribable period of misery much more cruel and difficult than the hardest time which our present struggle can bring.

"We will take care of these traitors. The Navy remains faithful to its oath in proven loyalty to the Fuehrer, unconditionally prepared for engagements and battles. It takes orders only from me, the supreme Naval commander, and from its own military leaders in order to guard against being misled by false instructions. It will recklessly destroy anyone who shows himself to be a traitor.

"Long live our Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler! "

3. (July 1944) v. 124, p. 262

Introduction of the German Salute into the Armed Forces 24 July 1944

"The Reichsmarshal of greater Germany, in his own name as well as the names of General Field Marshal Keitel and Grossadmiral Doenitz, reported to the Fuehrer that all branches of the armed forces on the occasion of his escape



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(from assassination) have requested that he should allow the German salute to be introduced into the armed forces as a token of their unbreakable faith to the Fuehrer and the closest union between the armed forces and the party."

"The Fuehrer granted the request of the armed forces and gave his approval. Replacement of saluting by raising the right hand to the head gear with saluting by rendering the German salute was made effective immediately."

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2878-PS

14 November 1945

I, ALFRED BREINER, Civilian, X-046349, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2878-PS

/s/ ALFRED BREINER
Civilian
X-046349

(3361)

Exhibit USB 188
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

H1163-0013

D 444

HITLER'S DEATH.

21.30, 21.42, 21.57

Attention, attention! The German Radio will broadcast a serious and important announcement to the German people (Music by Wagner and Bruckner).

22.26

(Repetititon of the announcement)

(Drums) It has been reported from the Fuhrer's Headquarters, that our Fuhrer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his Battle Headquarters at the Reichschancellery fighting to the last breath for Germany against Bolshevism.

On the 30th April the Fuhrer nominated Grand Admiral Doenitz to be his successor. The Grandadmiral and Fuhrer's successor will speak to the German nation.

Doenitz:

"German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed forces. Our Fuhrer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest sorrow and respect. Early he had recognised the terrible danger of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against it. His fight having ended, he died a hero's death in the capital of the German Reich, after having led a straight and steady life.

His life was dedicated to the service of Germany. His devotion in the fight against the Bolshevist flood was in the interest not only of Europe but of the entire civilised world. The Fuhrer has nominated me as his successor. Fully conscious of the responsibility, I am taking over the leadership of the German nation in this fateful hour, my first task is to save German men from being destroyed by the advancing Bolshevist enemy. For this reason only do the Armies continue fighting. As far and as long as the achievement of this task is being prevented by the British and Americans, we have to defend ourselves against them too and must go on fighting. Thus the Anglo-Americans are no longer carrying on the fight for their own peoples but only for the spreading of Bolshevism in Europe. What the German people have achieved in this war through fighting and sufferings they have undergone at home are unique in history. In the coming emergency arising for our people I shall to the best of my ability make it my business to secure for our brave women, men and children the most tolerable conditions essential to life.

In order to do this, I need your help. Give me your confidence, as your road is also my road. Uphold order and discipline in towns and country. Let everybody remain at his post doing his duty. Only thus will we be able to mitigate the suffering, which the future will bring for every one of us, and prevent the collapse. If we do all that is in our power, God will not forsake us after so much suffering and sacrifice."

("Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles" and the "Horst Wessel" Song)

22.30

There is now a radio silence of three minutes.

22.33

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Grandadmiral Doenitz issued the following order of the day to the German Armed Forces.

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"German Armed Forces, my comrades. The Fuhrer is dead. Faithful to his great idea to save the peoples of Europe from Bolshevism. He has devoted his life and has died the death of a hero. With him one of the greatest heroes of German history has gone. With proud respect and sorrow we lower the flags for him.

The Fuhrer has designated me to be his successor as head of State and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. I am taking over the Supreme Command of all branches of the German Armed Forces with the will to carry on the struggle against the Bolshevists until the fighting forces and until hundreds of thousands of families of the German Eastern area have been saved from slavery and destruction.

Against the English and Americans I must continue to fight on as long as they prevent me from carrying on the fight (- translator's addition - ? against Bolshevism).

The situation requires from you, who have achieved such great historic deeds, and who are longing for the end of this war, further unconditional devotion. I demand discipline and obedience. Only by carrying out my orders unconditionally will chaos and destruction be avoided. He is a coward and traitor who, especially at this time, evades his duties and thus brings death or slavery to German women and children.

The oath sworn by you to the Fuhrer is now owed to me by everyone of you as the successor appointed by the Fuhrer.

German soldiers do your duty. The life of our nation is at stake!"

(Serious music)

Reichsprograme North (Hamburg)

Checked by S/Ldr. C.B. Hill, 111414 19th December 1945.

I, C.B. HILL, Squadron Leader R.A.F. hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct translation of document No. D 444.

G. B. HILL
Squadron Leader
R.A.F.

(3441)

H1163-0015

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C.126/C
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

C.126/C

EXTRACT FROM MEMO OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY.

Top Secret.

To be carried out by the C-in-C of the Navy!

Berlin, 16th May.1939.

The C-in-C of the Navy,

B No.1, SKL.Ia Op 48/39 Top Secret Chief Matter.

Chief Matter!

By Officer only! Vfg.

1. Copies to:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Group East | | Copy No.1 |
| Station N for Group West | | " " 2 |
| for information: | Fleet | " " 3 |
| | B.d.A. | " " 4 |
| | F.d.T | " " 5 |
| | F.d.U | " " 6 |
| | F.d.M | " " 7 |
| | F.d.Luft | " " 8 |
| | B.S.O. | " " 9 |
| | B.S.N. | " " 10 |
| | Luftwaffe General attd. to C-in-C Navy. | " " 11 |

Subject: Directive "Fall Weiss".

No Action.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1. Directive by the Führer:

The Führer has issued the following directive:

"Fall Weiss"

Poland's present attitude necessitates military preparations being made over and above the protection of the Eastern Frontiers already dealt with, in order if necessary to eliminate all threats from this side for ever.

2. Conclusions in the military field:-

The Major aims in building up the German Army continue to be determined by the hostility of the Western democracies. "Fall Weiss" constitutes merely a completion, by way of precaution, of preparations, and should on no account by regarded as the forerunner of a settlement with our opponents in the West by force of arms.

3865.

12

H1163-0016



The isolation of Poland will be maintained the more readily even after the outbreak of war, if we succeed in opening the war with heavy blows struck by surprise and followed up by rapid successes.

---

8. (a) .... It can be expected that Y-hour will be a time in the early hours of the morning, two hours before it grows light (three hours before sunrise).
This time of day is required by the Navy to carry out the measures she has to take, and is recognised by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

(b) With a view to maintaining, on a large scale, the routine of peace-time training, and to avoiding a premature exposure of the measures it is intended to take, a warning (preparation) period of 48 hours may be expected ....

V. Date fixed for completion of preparations

According to the instructions of the Führer, "Fall Weiss" should be so worked on that it can be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards ....

C.126/E

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET. F.O. (U/B) & B.d.U.

Berlin, August 2nd, 19[illegible].

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Slk. by 12 August (Ink note - a decision on the sailings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August).

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest ....

(Initialled) F.d.U.
Slk.
1/Slk.

H1163 - 0017

Exhibit USA 189
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

SEC 24-10/C-172

C.172.

Commanders, U-Boats
Ref. Top Secret III

F. O. (U / B)
Order No. 1 for "Fall Weiss"
Mining Operations Hela Peninsula.

"I. General Notes

1) "Fall Weiss" comprises the task of destroying the Polish Armed Forces by a surprise and lightening operation, and this includes the elminiation of the Polish Naval Forces, the stopping of Polish Maritime trade, and unobtrusive reconnaissance by the Navy of the Baltic and Kattegat, - also the Navy's protection of these against intervention by the forces of a foreign power."

2) Mining undertakings along the route off the northern shore of the Hela Peninsula will be carried out as soon as operation "Fall Weiss" becomes effective and as laid down in paragraph 5b, as follows:

During the period

| | |
|---|---|
| From 16.7 to 10.8 | U-28, U-32, U-31 |
| From 11.8 to 19.8 | U-27, U-32, U-33 |
| From 10.8 (pencil note -20.8.22) until further notice | U-27, U-32, U-35 |

according to the following order.

Translator's note - The remainder of the document deals only with the technical details of carrying out a U-boat operation).

(signed) DOENITZ

Distribution

| | |
|---|---|
| Group East | Copies 1 - 2 |
| Fleet | Copy 3 |
| S.O.Reconnaissance Forces | Copy 4 |
| F.O. (U/B) | Copy 5 |
| F.O. (U/B) East | Copy 6 |
| Chief of U-boat flotillas | |
| 6th U-Flotilla | Copy 7 |
| 3rd U-Flotilla | Copies 8 - 10 |
| S.O. (Naval Air Force) | Copy 11 |
| Spare | Copies 12 - 15 |

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
DOCUMENT NO. C-172

18th December 1945.

I, C.B. HILL, 111414, Squadron-Leader R.A.F., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct translation of Document C.172.

C.B. HILL
Squadron Leader
R. A. F.

(3366)

14

H1163 - 0018

C.122

SEC24/6/C-122

GAINING OF BASES IN NORWAY

3.10.39

(Extract from War Diary)

"The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration:

a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?

d) Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they already advantages suitable for supply position.
(F.O.U-boats already considers such harbours extremely useful as equipment - and supply - bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily).

e) What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the War at sea in gaining bases in North Denmark e.g. Skagen?

Translator's note: Chief of Naval War Staff - Raeder.



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H1163 – 0019

SEC24-1/C-5

C 5

FLAG OFFICER SUBMARINES
OPERATIONS DIVISION
B. Nr. MOST SECRET. SO. ONLY

Wilhelmshaven, 9.10.39

M-O-S-T S-E-C-R-E-T

To: Supreme Command of the Navy - Naval War Staff/ 1st Div.
No written reference.

Subject: Base in Norway

I. SUPPOSITIONS:

a) A position outside the Shetlands - Norway Straits.
b) Freedom from ice.
c) Rail communications.

These suppositions apply only to Trondheim and Narvik .

II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES:

1) Trondheim:

Advantages:

a) Position within the fiord which is unaffected by artillery action from the sea.
b) Deep water in the entry channels - difficult for the enemy to mine in their mining operations.
c) Existence of several entry and exit routes.
d) Protected areas directly in front of the harbour for exercises and entry.
e) Southern position: i.e. short lines of communications to Germany, better climatic conditions, shorter route to the Atlantic.
f) Basins which, according to the North Sea Handbook and instructions of the Navy Office at Hamburg, are suitable for U-boats.
g) Several industrial installations which facilitate the construction of repair - and supply installations.

Disadvantages:

Short distance from the bases of the British Air force - danger of air attack.

2) Narvik:

Advantages:

a), b), c), d) the same conditions as Trondheim

e) Greater distance from British bases - less danger of air attack.





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H1163 – 0020



Disadvantages:

a) Northern position: Long lines of communication to Germany, unfavourable climatic conditions, longer route to the Atlantic.
b) Communications only with the Baltic - The Gulf of Bothnia is not gree from ice.
c) No basins, quay-installations only in the bay.
d) Very few industrial installations.

Trondheim is therefore the more favourable place.

III. The following is therefore proposed:

1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:

a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, provisions.
b) Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter.
c) Good opportunities for accommodating U/boat crews.
d) Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.

2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative.

Sgd. Doenitz.



17

H1163 - 0021

Translation of Document No. C151
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

(SEC24-8/C-151

EXTRACTS FROM THE OPERATION ORDER FOR
OPERATION "HARTMUT"

Commander in Chief of U-Boats,
Operations Department,
B.Nr.Most Secret SC 420

30.3.40
Copy No. 1

Top Secret

S. C.

Officer Only.

Operation order 'HARTMUT' (initialled by Fricke among others)

(II EDITION)

Occupation of Denmark and Norway

This order comes into force on the codeword "Hartmut". With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity.

The Day and Hour are designated as "Wesser-Day" and "Weser Hour" and the whole operation is known as "Weserubung".

Situation:

The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side.

The primary requisite for success once the landing is accomplished is the hindering of enemy countermeasures, above all of troop landings, until an adequate number of troops has been put ashore. With this object orders have been given for the full commitment of all naval force.....

II (5) The naval force will as they enter the harbour fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvick.....

(Signed in draft) Doenitz
(Certified) Godt

+Translators' Note: "Toughness"

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO C 151

17.11.45

I, ENID M.STANDRING, P.C.52012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages: and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C 151.

ENID M STANDRING,
P.O.
52012

2256)

18

H1163 - 0022

Exhibit GB 191
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

D 64.1/a

EXTRACTS FROM OFFICIAL FOREIGN OFFICE REPORT CONCERNING GERMAN ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING, SEPTEMBER 3, 1939 to SEPTEMBER 1940.

After twelve months of the war, it may be convenient to review the course of the warfare on the sea, in so far as it affects merchant shipping, both Allied and Neutral. . . . . The conclusion to which (this paper) inevitably tends, is that there is perhaps no field of warfare in which British and German methods have been shown up in greater contrast.

During the first twelve months of the war, 2,081,062 tons of Allied (') shipping comprising 508 ships have been lost by enemy action. In addition, 769,213 tons of neutral shipping, comprising 253 ships, have also been lost. Nearly all these merchant ships have been sunk by submarine, mine, aircraft or surface craft, and the great majority of them sunk while engaged on their lawful trading occasions. 2,836 Allied merchant seamen have lost their lives in these ships.

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In the last war the practice of the central powers was so remote from the recognised procedure that it was thought necessary to set forth once again the rules of warfare in particular as applied to submarines. This was done in the Treaty of London 1930, and in 1936 Germany acceded to these rules. The rules laid down :-

(1) "In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subjected".

(2) "In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a war ship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ships papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ships boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board".

At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a Prize Ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare, and the guidance of her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72 however, provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into port, and Article 73 (i) (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy. These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the traditional British view but the important point is that, even in these cases, the Prize Ordinance envisages the capture of the merchantman before its destruction. In other words if the Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own Prize Ordinance, we have argued the rather fine legal point with them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war with steadily increasing disregard for international law, and for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law: the protection of human life and property from arbitary and ruthless attacks.

It will perhaps now be convenient to examine German attacks under various headings.



3832

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H1163 - 0023

A - On Neutrals.

Records here are necessarily scanty and incomplete. Although 253 neutrals were sunk, sufficient facts are known in less than half that number of cases to enable an opinion to be formed as to the legality or otherwise of the attack. However it will be pretty safe to assume that nearly all the sinkings after the first month of the war were illegal, except for those which occurred in British convoys, and which total five for the whole year. At any rate, it is possible to say that a "prima facie" case of illegality might be made out in at least fifty cases of attacks by submarines and in some twenty cases of attacks by aircraft. As regards mining, it is known that seventy-nine neutral ships have been sunk by this means. Here the evidence is necessarily even more incomplete that in the case of sinkings by submarine, because in the nature of things it is usually impossible to prove where a mine has exploded, whether it was British or German. The great majority of neutral ships which were mined were sunk in the main highways of British trade, and close to places where British ships either had been or were to be sunk. It does not, therefore, seem likely that the mines which sunk them were British.

During the first month of the war German submarines stopped a certain number of neutrals, mostly in the Baltic or its approaches, and sank them after due warning and with some provision for the safety of the crews. Such sinkings were those of the Swedish ships "Nyland" and "Silesis", the Finnish "Martti Ragnar" and "Walma" and Norwegian "Jern" etc. Although certainly illegal according to the British view, these sinkings might be justified on the basis of the German Prize Ordinance; they do not however, amount to a dozen in all.

On the 30th. September 1939, came the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of life. This was the Danish ship "Vendia" bound for the Clyde in ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had already signalled that he would submit to the submarines orders and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship. By November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th. November the Norwegian "Arne Kjode" was torpedoed in the North Sea without any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their lives and the remainder were picked up after many hours in open boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an increasing recklessnes as to the fate of the crew.

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B - On Allied Merchant Vessels.

(1) Submarine and Surface Craft :- It is necessary to bear in mind the difference between the German and British views of the legality of destruction after capture when reckoning up the total number of illegal sinkings. In a certain number of early cases the German commander allowed the crew of the merchant vessel to get clear, and even made some provision for them before he destroyed the vessel. Such destruction was in accordance with Article 72 of the Prize Ordinance, and, therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt in such cases . . . . . The following are the figures on record :-

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ships sunk | ... | ... | 241 |
| Recorded attacks | ... | ... | 221 |
| Illegal attacks | ... | ... | 112 |

(At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning. This does not of course include convoy ships.)





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H1163 – 0024

By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet four months later the Germans were still officially claiming that they were acting in accordance with their Prize Ordinance. Their own semi-official commentators however, had made the position clearer. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily or under compulsion bound for an enemy port - including contraband control harbours - thereby loses its neutrality and must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which obtained a navicert from a British Consul in in order to avoid putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral port to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of November 1939, a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines, and after that date some fifteen more unarmed Allied vessels were torpedoed without warning. It is clear, therefore, that not only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure, but also that neither before nor after this German threat dis the German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed vessels.

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To sum up, therefore, the analysis of the evidence shows a rapid deterioration in the methods of German sea warfare and a steady increase in lawlessness and inhumanity. In fact, of course, the aim of the Germans may be expressed in one word : terrorisation. Whether the fault lay with submarine commanders, who became increasingly uneasy in the knowledge that they were being hunted by the Royal Navy or whether it lay with the Nazis at home whose one object was to force all neutral and Allied shipping from the seas by gangster methods, it is impossible to say with certainty. What is certain is that long before the end of the first year of war the Germans had departed very far from the principles laid down in their Prize Ordinance. When the German methods are contrasted with the British system of contraband control stations and navicerts, the full extent of the difference between the German and British attitudes is apparent. However irksome neutrals may find our system, at least it preserves their shipping intact and their crews alive, instead of sending the vessels to the bottom of the sea and setting the men adrift, maybe 200 miles from land in a mid-Atlantic gale. The fundamental difference between the two methods is that the one conforms to a clearly defined and enunciated principle of law, while the other knows no principle but that of expediency. As the Berlin spokesman who claimed the right to sink neutrals with navicerts remarked: "We shall break the British blockade one way or another. One way or another: that is the voice of the gangster.

H1163-0025

191

DOCUMENT NO. D-641/b

EXTRACTS FROM OFFICIAL FOREIGN OFFICE REPORT CONCERNING GERMAN ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING. SEPT. 1. 1940 TO FEB. 28.1941.

On the 30th January, 1941, Hitler proclaimed that "every ship, with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes is going to be torpedoed". On the face of it, this announcement appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification provided by the context is that the threats immediately preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the German "total blockade" is alleged to be in force.

From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly was Hitler's meaning, since the only conclusion that can be reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but solely by the opportunities (or lack of them) which exist at any given time. Thus, as a previous paper on this subject has shown, the Germans, in utter disregard not only of international law but also of their own rules as set out in their Prize Ordinance were regularly sinking merchant shipping, neutral as well as Allied, in the waters round Britain for at least ten months before the proclamation of their "total blockade". Equally, as will be seen from this paper, now that the "total blockade" has been proclaimed, they habitually make illegal attacks on ships outside as well as inside its area.

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The effect of the German "total blockade" is to prohibit neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon pain of having their ships sunk without warning and their crews killed. As a matter of fact, at least thirty-two neutral ships, exclusive of those sailing in British convoys have been sunk by enemy action since the declaration of the "total blockade". Details are not available in most cases, but there can be little doubt that the majority of these attacks were carried out without warning, and the death-roll is known to be several hundreds. Thus, apart from the effect on neutral trade, the German blockade inflicts upon neutral subjects a wholly disproportionate amount of suffering.

Even if the "total blockade" were in itself a justifiable measure, the Germans use wholly illegal means in carrying it out. The German proclamation says nothing about sinking merchant ships without warning. Yet, though information is lacking in very many cases, details are available to prove that, during the period under review, at least thirty-eight Allied merchant ships, exclusive of those in convoys have been torpedoed without warning in or near the "total blockade" area.

That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the area is proved by the fact that of the thirty-eight ships referred to at least sixteen were torpedoed outside the limits of the war-zone.

The development of enemy tactics in the war on shipping is a theme outside the scope of this paper, but two aspects of the matter may perhaps be mentioned. The first is the increase in the proportion of torpedo attacks without warning to gun-fire attacks by submarines on the surface. Whereas for the first twelve months the ratio was rather under 3:1, for the last six months it is approximately 8:1. Whatever may be the factors which contribute to this increase, the result must be that in many more cases the last shreds of legitimacy are torn from enemy submarine attacks. Not even the Germans can advance the excuse that they were entitled to sink a ship on account of her persistent refusal to stop, if she has never had a chance of seeing the submarine.

H1163-0026



The deplorable consequences of this type of warfare have been illustrated so often that they have almost become a commonplace. It is only when people's consciences are shocked by what seems a particularly brutal attack that it is realised how deplorable they are. The sinking of the "City of Benares" on the 17th September 1940, is a good example of this. The "City of Benares" was an 11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly 100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the "war zone", with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children. It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p.m. In the darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at least four of the twelve boats lowered were capsized. Others were swamped and many people were washed right out of them. In one boat alone sixteen people, including 11 children, died from exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children, in a third 21 died. The point to be emphasised is not the unusual brutality of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans have done and are doing. Probably the commander of the U-boat did not know, when he fired his torpedo, that there were children on board the "City of Benares". It may be that he did not even know the name of the ship, although there is strong evidence that he must have been dogging her for some hours before torpedoing her. What he must have known, however, was that this was a large merchant ship, probably with civilian passengers on board, certainly with a crew of merchant seamen. He knew the state of the weather, and he knew that they were 600 miles from land. Yet he followed them outside the blockade area and deliberately abstained from firing his torpedo until after nightfall, when the chances of rescue would be enormously diminished.

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There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know that such things are the inevitable result of the type of warfare he has chosen to employ.

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In all, during the six months from September 1940, some 290 Allied vessels have been sunk by enemy action when not in convoy. The loss of life is approximately 2,500. The Führer's announcement that unconvoyed as well as convoyed ships will in future be torpedoed is therefore not exactly news. The avowed aim of the Germans, as announced by Admiral Raeder on the 28th January, 1941, is to cut off mercilessly British imports and destroy Britain's power to live. The same speaker referred to the German war on merchant shipping as a "heroic struggle".

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Other Germans, U-boat commanders and aircraft pilots have described with relish how they singled out their unsuspecting victims, carefully choosing those of the largest size.

We may be forgiven for failing to see anything very heroic in the torpedoing of the "City of Benares",..... or of the hundreds of other merchant vessels, from the Athenia down to a Faroese fishing smack with a crew of seven. Even the German officers who gloat over their successes do not make such pretension to heroism. One of them compared his work to that of a wolf among a flock of sheep. The comparison is the enemy's, as the choice of warfare was his: and it is surely right that these facts should be put on record.

3833.

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H1163 – 0027

43191

D. 641/C

Trade Division,
Admiralty,
S.W. 1.

Sinkings by U-Boats during the war, 1939-1945 :-

2,775 British, Allied and Neutral Ships totalling
14,572,435 Gross Tons

I, Captain (S) Reginald Patrick MacKenzie, R.N. (Retd.) in charge of Statistical Section of Trade Division of the Admiralty, hereby certify that the above figures are true and correct according to the information and records available in the Admiralty.

(Sgd) R.P. MacKenzie
Captain (S) R.N.

27.12.45.

3828

24

H1163 - 0028

Exhibit GB 192
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

D-644

NID 24/T 18/45

TOP SECRET

# THE SINKING OF S.S. "SHEAF MEAD"

N.I.D. 24
2.7.45

N.I.D. 24/T 18/45 TOP SECRET

H1163-0029

## THE SINKING OF S.S. "SHELF MEAD"

The British s/s. "SHELF MEAD" was torpedoed without warning on 27.5.40, with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man was Kapitaenleutnant Oehrn of U37: the following extract from his diary for 27.5.40. leaves no doubt on the matter and speaks for itself as to his behaviour.

Kapitaenleutnant Oehrn was a prisoner of war, but has now been repatriated.

"27 May

1252 Steamship sighted, steering west. She must therefore be proceeding from Vigo or La Coruna. Probably up to 5,000 tons. Speed approx. 10 knots. Start tracking. Enemy is steering a zig-zag course of only about 10 degrees and so slightly that, at first, the changes of course are taken for yawing. Only after a while is the cause realised, and then it is doubtful whether, with the changing visibility and great distance, the position had not been miscalculated..

1243 W/T message from B.d.U. (F.O. U-Boats)

"Enemy auxiliary cruisers are operating between 41°-42° 30' and 10° 30' - 11° West, against a German steamship sailing from Vigo."

1444 Boat now in position ahead of steamship. Dived. Nothing as yet to be seen in periscope. Swell considerably hinders depth-keeping and observation. She cannot be very far away by now - and still n nothing. Hydrophone is operated - nothing. Then she comes in sight 4-5,000 metres away. In this case, a steamship capable of 9-10 knots; was therefore sighted in the periscope before she was heard. This, in spite of otherwise excellent installations. So one cannot always rely on hydrophones.
At full speed, keep abreast of her. But what is a steamship doing here on a course of 280°? Can she be German? It seems that some are to put out from Vigo.
She would arrive here just at this time, putting out last night. From appearances, about 3,000-5,000 G.R.T. The officer of watch III is an authority on merchant ships and suggests she may be a Levantine steamer. Only a short time is to elapse, now, before we fire.
I must on not account make a mistake, and feel I have been rather driven into a corner over this matter.

H1163 - 0030

The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in quickly, but the position is stll 40-50. I cannot see the stern yet. Tube ready.. shall I or not ? The gunnery crews are also prepared. On the ship's side a yellow cross on a small, square, dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an A/A gun or something similar. Fire! It cannot miss. Periscope up, observation. Aft of the funnel, a boxlike erection of sail and wood- en lathes. Hit scored aft 30. Distence was 320 metres. Stern sinks considerably. The crew jump into the boats. The bows rise up. I have a look round.

1554 Surface. Stern is underwater. Bows rise higher. The boats are now on the water. Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush with great bounds along the deck down to the stern. The stern disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crashing. Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved them - selves on wreckage and capsized boats. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says,

1648 hardly turning his head- Nix Name. A young boy in the water calls "help, help, please". The others are very composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold hatred is on their faces. Onto the old course. After washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light:-
Greatafield, Glasgow. 5086 G.R.T. [m]
It is not clear whether she was sailing as a normal merchant ship. The following seem to point to the contrary:-

1. The course. She must have put out from a Spanish port, and steered a course off the normal traffic route.
2. The blue square with the yellow cross on the ship's side. It may have some tactical significance.
3. The circumstance that she was painted grey and carried no name.
4. The order and discipline amongst the crew during, and after, the sinking of the ship. Also, the crew were not in uniform.
5. The remarkable box/like erection behind the funnel, behind which another gun may have been hidden."

([m] The name of the ship was "Gretaston" before it was changed in January 1940.)

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N.I.D. 24
2.7.45

I, D.P.W. Williamson, Lieutenant, R.N.V.R., possessing a thorough knowledge of the English and German languages, hereby certify that the above is an official Admiralty report and a true and correct translation of a German document held by the British Admiralty.

H1163-0031

SHEAF MEAD 5,008 G.r.t. Voyage Swansea to Philadelphia.

Torpedoed and sunk by U-boat at 1250 27th May, 1940.

Number of lives lost 31. Some presumed by drowning, others by exposure.

Extract from Chief Engineers Reports. Begins -

When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side, that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about 5 yards away. The submarine Captain asked the steward the name of the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our lifebuoys, but this had the name "GRETASTON" on it, as this was the name of our ship before it was changed to "SHEAF MEAD" last January.

The Captain was a young fellow of about 28, height 5'10", about 13 stone and well built. He had fair hair, was rather good-looking with sharp features, and was clean-shaven. He spoke good English with a very deep voice. He was the only man in uniform, I think he had two gold stripes, and he wore a cape with a badge but no braid. There were about 10 men on the deck of the submarine, all of whom appeared to be freshly shaved; they were very young, only boys really, and they wore blue and brown dungarees, or a kind of smock like that worn by fishermen. No one was in khaki, nor wearing forage caps. I did not hear them speaking German amongst themselves, and there was no sound of any wireless.

The submarine must have surfaced very quickly, as it was in full view when I came up from my room. There was no warning noise of any kind before we were torpedoed and no one appears to have sighted her; the gunner who had been on the gun platform until 1230 had gone below for his lunch, and was about to return to his station at 1250. He was never seen again.

She was painted a greenish-grey colour with no markings of any description, and she looked absolutely brand new. She was rather long, about 150-200 feet with one gun well forward from the bridge. This gun was covered and not manned. There were two rows of slots along the side; we could see a man walking round under the deck on a level with the upper row of slots. She had cut-away bows but I did not notice a net cutter. Two men stood at the side with boat hooks, to keep us off.

They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us in the water, otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing. Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any assistance whatever. Ends.

(3468)

SEC -24-10/C-191

Extract from document entitled: Exhibit USA 193 Filed Jan. 14, 1946

Demands of F.O. U-boats and military possibilities of carrying them out.

Berlin 22 Sept. 1939

1 Copy

1) F.O. U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights.

Previous instructions, permitting attacks on French war- and merchant-ships only as a defensive measure, purely French or Anglo-French convoys only North of the latitude of Brest, and forbidding attacks on all passenger ships, give rise to great difficulties for U-boats, especially at night. In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviat mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that ever possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden t make any attacks at night in waters where French and English Nava forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measu desired by F.O. U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possi confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.

In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without light This instruction was approved on 21.9 by C-in-C Navy.

Translator's note:

The rest of the document is considered irrelevant.
No signature is appended

H1163-0032

H1163 - 0033

Exhibit #13 194
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

(SEC-24.3/C-21

INTENSIFICATION OF U-BOAT WARFARE

(Extracts from a File)

(N.B. In extracts 4 and 5 the words in brackets are explanations and NOT part of the translated text)

1. Page 1. Conference with Head of Naval War Staff: 1.1.40.
Special Points

1) Report by I a (Translator's Note: Chief of Staff) on Directive of Armed Forces High Command of 30.12. According to this, the Führer, on report of C.in C. Navy, has decided:

(a) "Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.

(Pencil Note: "For the conduct of the air war too? See page 5 above")

(b) In the Bristol Channel, all ships may be attacked without warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given out as hits by mines.

Both measures may be taken with immediate effect".

2. Page 5. Conference with Head of Naval War Staff 2.1.40.

Special Points:

1) Report by Ia on Directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30.12., referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with "Fall Gelb" /

In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorise, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats, without any warning, of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, pretence should be made that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.

/ Translator's Note: "Fall Gelb" is the German Code word for the invasion of Holland and Belgium.

H1163-0034



(SEC-24.3/C.21.)

3. Page 37. U-boats Warfare against Merchantmen
6.1.40.

..... the Führer has in principle agreed (see minutes of report of C.in C. Navy of 30.12.) to authorise firing without warning whilst maintaining the pretence of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockaded zone. In accordance with this, the following order is herewith given to the Flag Officer Submarines, Group East and Group West:

"All U Boats in the North Sea, position between 61° and 56° North and 4° W and 0°, are authorised to make immediately unrestricted use of weapons against all ships. Attacks should be unobserved so that the pretence of mine hits can be maintained".

4. Page 139.
18.1.40.

Special Points:

1) The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following Directive dated 17.1. cancelling the previous order concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen:

"The Navy will authorise, with immediate effect, the sinking without warning by U Boats, of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended.

U-Boats must adapt their behaviour and employment of weapons to the pretence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines. Ships of the U.S.A., Italy, Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks".

("Spain" has been added underneath in green pencil)

.....(The Naval High Command, commenting on this order, says:) The pretence of mine hits must be maintained, i.e. the boats must avoid being seen by the use of electric torpedoes; and they may fire without warning only in areas in which the use of mines can be pretended.

5. Page 221.
26.1.40.

Extract from minutes of report of C.in C.Navy to Führer

.....(After mentioning the Führer's decisions on, and agreement with, measures for intensifying U-Boat warfare against merchant shipping the minutes end with the words:) Attacks should be unobserved in order to preserve as far as possible the pretence of hits by mines.

H1163-0035

Exhibit GB 195
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

(SEC-24.6/C-118)

C.118

AUTHORISATION OF ATTACKS ON

U.S. MERCHANTMEN.

(Extract from a file)

Page 276. 18.7.41.

Special Points

I. Supplementary to the order forbidding for the time being attacks on U.S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered the following:

1. Attacks on U.S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U.S. convoys, or independently is authorised in the original operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.S. - blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U.S.A. - Iceland.

(3368)

H1163-0036

N.I.D. 24/T.233/45. Exhibit USA 196 Filed Jan. 14, 1946 D.642

EXTRACT FROM BEFEHLSHABER DER U-BOOTE'S SECRET STANDING ORDER NO. 154, SIGNED DÖNITZ.

para. e). Do not pick up survivors and take them with you. Do not worry about the merchant-ship's boats. Weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible ! We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, RICHARD LONG, Lieutenant Commander, R.N.V.R., hereby certify that I am thoroughly acquainted with the English and German languages and that this is a true and correct translation of Document No.

Richard Long

H1163 - 0037

Exhibit GB 197
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

D 423.

Extract from

Memorandum on the conversation between the Fuhrer and Ambassador Oshima, in presence of the Reich Foreign Minister in the Wolfschanze on 3rd January 1942, from 1615 to 1800 hours

F.7 0086

".... The Fuhrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, emphasising that he considers his most important task is to get the U-boat warfare going in full swing. The U-boats are being re-organised. Firstly he had recalled all U-boats operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted outside U.S.A. ports. Later they would be off Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown. He hopes to put 20 to 24 boats into operation along the coast of the United States alone by February. These boats are in a position to remain there for four weeks, before having to return. After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuhrer pointed out, that however many ships the U.S.A. built, one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason even Merchant Ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets round that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which is not always possible on the open sea, U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.

Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Fuhrer's comments and said that the Japanese too are forced to follow these methods....."

(3310)

H1163-0038

Exhibit GB 198
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

D.446

EXTRACT FROM THE B.D.U. WAR DIARY OF 16TH SEPTEMBER 1942

"With four full boats in tow U 156 has been bombed five times by an American aircraft of the "Liberator" type, and this in spite of flying a large Red Cross flag. Both periscopes are temporarily out of action. The boat is discontinuing her help and putting all the shipwrecked men overboard. She is ordered to take no further part in rescue operations. All boats are again told that their own safety may under no circumstances be endangered. If necessary, they should resort to any measures, even the ruthless breaking off of all salvage operations. Only Italians should be kept on board and be handed over to the French at the rendezvous agreed upon. As is evident from the message from U 156, the Commanding Officer believed that the enemy would refrain from making an attack when he saw a Red Cross flag, and the rescue measures being taken. This point of view is incomprehensible. It must be assumed that the sight of so many hundreds of survivors struggling for their lives possibly influenced him to think thus."

H1163 – 0039

(3135)

Exhibit GB 199
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

D.630.

TOP SECRET
T.C.I.2100/17/9/42
T.C.O. 1924/17.

TRITON O.

To : All commanding officers.

1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsised lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.

2. Orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still apply.

3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance for your boat.

4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.

D.630.

Extract from B.d.U. War Diary under heading :

17th September 1942.

"2. The attention of all Commanding Officers is again drawn to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and Chief Engineers still stand".

D.630.

"America" W/T. service. T.O.I. 0044/18/9/42.
T.O.O. 1930/17.
TRITONA

From : Schacht.

163 Italians handed over to "Annamite". Navigating officer of "Lyconia" and another English officer on board. 7 lifeboats with about 330 English and Poles, including 15 women and 16 children, deposited in naval grid square FE 9612. Women and children accommodated on board for one night. All shipwrecked persons given hot meals and drinks, clothes and bandages where necessary. 4 more boats sighted lying to a sea anchor in naval grid square FE9619. Both positions passed to "Gloire", which moved off immediately to search. Still 28 cubic metres, 20 days' provisions, 9 "eels", fully operationally effective.

"America" W/T service. T.O.I.1217/20/9/42
T.O.O.1107/20.
TRITONA

To : Schacht.
Action as in W/T message of 17/9. was wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for the rescue of English and Poles.

Exhibit G13 200
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

H1163 - 0040

D. 663.

High Command of the Navy.
2nd Section, Naval War Staff/F.O. U-Boats
B.No. Top Secret 6420.

A.1.

7 October 1943
Copy No. 57

Top Secret

Operation Order "Atlantic" No. 56 for U-Boats in the Atlantic dated 7 October 1943

.....

5) B .....

b) Rescue Ships

A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to every convoy - a special ship of up to 3,000 g.r.t., which is intended for the picking up of survivors after U-boat attacks. These ships are for the most part equipped with a ship-borne aircraft and large motor-boats, are strongly armed (depth-charge throwers) and very manoeuvrable, so that they are often called U-boat traps by the commander. In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, their sinking is of great value.

.....

H1163 - 0041

Exhibit US 201
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

D,566

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN 0-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Oberleutnant Z.S. PETER-JOSEF HEISIG, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 27th day of November 1945.

WALTER H. RAPP
Captain CAV
0-454231.

3570.

38

H1163 - 0042

Translation of D.566

STATEMENT

27.11.45.

The news that German U-Boat officers are accused of murdering shipwrecked allied seamen makes me feel it my duty to give the following testimony.

In September 1942 I was sent as a midshipman to attend a course for U-Boat Officers of the Watch (U.W.O. Lehrgang) at the 2nd U-Boat Training Division (2te U.L.D.) at Gotenhafen-Oxhoelt.

At the end of September - or it might have been at the beginning of October - Grand Admiral Doenitz, who was then still C-in-C U-Boats carried out an inspection (data for the exact date of this inspection are in a diary at my parents' and are not available to me at the moment). During the period between 10 and 11.45 o'clock Grand Admiral Doenitz spoke about the military situation in the Theatre Hall of the 2nd U.L.D.

The gist of this talk of Admiral Doenitz's about the position, during which I heard his words clearly and distinctly, was as follows: U-boat successes have diminished at the moment. The reason for this is the energetic use of air patrols by the enemy. One cannot however expect the old successes to be achieved again in a few months as a result of the development of new anti-aircraft weapons. Hitler personally assured him, Doenitz, that U-boats would be given priority in the allocation of the new anti-aircraft weapons.

To a question by an officer with reference to an article in the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" about ship-building in the U.S.A., Admiral Doenitz replied:

According to news received from America we were bound to reckon with the possibility that in the Allied countries more than 1,000,000 net registered tons of new merchant shipping space would be brought into service monthly. This was more shipping space than would be sunk even with good U-boat successes. The bottleneck of the Allies lay only in the problem of personnel for these newly built ships. The Atlantic route was too dangerous for seamen so that they even had to be brought aboard ship under compulsion. This was the point where we, the U-boat crews, had to take a hand. He therefore demanded that we should from now on carry on total warfare against ship and crew. That meant: so far as possible, no seaman from a sunk ship was to get home any more. Only thus could the supply line of the British Isles be seriously endangered and only thus in the long run could we strike a noticeable blow at Allied merchant shipping traffic. In this way it would be impossible for the opponent even to make use of his newly built ships, since no more crews would be available to him. After the sinking of a ship, every possibility of rescue must be denied to the crew, through the destruction of every means of saving life.

I later discussed these remarks of Admiral Doenitz's with the others, and all present unanimously and unambiguously took them to mean that after the sinking of a ship, all possibility of escape, whether in boats, on rafts or by any other means, must be denied to the crew and the destruction of the crew was to be attempted by every means. This mode of warfare was for me as for most of my comrades completely new. Owing to Admiral Doenitz's authoritative position, it was nevertheless fully and completely accepted by many of them. He sought to invalidate in advance any doubts which might arise, by pointing to the air war and the bombing.

I still remember details of this address; it is, however, not possible for me to cite them all in this statement.

(3371)

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H1163 - 0043

Exhibit GB 202
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

382-PS

I, Korvettenkapitän Karl-Heinz MOEHLE, lately of Kiel, Germany, and now a prisoner-of-war in British hands make oath and say as follows :-

1. The contents of the statement hereunto annexed signed by me and marked 'A' are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

2. The paper writing hereunto annexed and marked 'B' is extracted from B.d.U. war diary under date Seventeenth September Nineteen Hundred and Forty Two and is a correct précis of the Order of September Nineteen Hundred and Forty Two referred to in the said statement signed by me.

3. I make this affidavit of my own free will and clearly understanding that it may be used as evidence against me.

Sworn by the said )
Karl-Heinz MOEHLE at )
Beaconfield in the )
County of Buckingham ) (Sgd) MOEHLE
this Twenty-first Day )
of July Nineteen Hundred )
and Forty-five )

before me

(Sgd) J.C. Marsip

Commissioner for Oaths.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 382-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1163 - 0044

TRANSLATION OF A WRITTEN STATEMENT BY
KORVETTENKAPITAN MOEHLE
DATED 19th JULY, 1945

A. ORDER OF SEPTEMBER, 1942

In September 1942 (I can no longer recollect the exact date), the following W/T message was given to all U-boats and operational flotillas by the Commander in Chief U-boats in officers' cypher, i.e. Top Secret:-

1. "All rescue measures such as righting of capsized lifeboats, going alongside, provisioning, towing to land, etc., are absolutely forbidden and must cease.

2. Previous orders concerning the rescue and taking prisoner of masters and chief engineers remain in force since their interrogation is of the highest importance to the High Command. Boats should rescue as many as they can carry.

3. All rescue measures contradict the most primitive demands of warfare that ships and crews should be destroyed.

4. You must be hard and remember that the enemy in his bombing attacks on German towns has no consideration for women and children.

This W/T message was without any doubt sent out at the instigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e. Grand Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in which the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider it quite impossible that an order of such importance could have been given without his knowledge.

I do not know whether the order was given with the concurrence or at the instigation of the Supreme Command, i.e. the Fuehrer's headquarters, or at the instigation of the Fuehrer himself after one of his many conferences with Grand Admiral Doenitz.

As Senior Officer of the 5th U-boat Flotilla, it was my duty to pass on these instructions of Commander in Chief U-boats to Commanding Officers of U-boats which were leaving on their war patrols.

So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and in particular for those who know the manner in which Commander in Chief U-Boats is wont to give his orders, that the High Command regard it as desirable that not only ships but also their crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that they should be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was continually stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood this order in that way.

Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words. It would then only have stated that for reasons of security rescue measures were to cease and this order would have been passed as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps even the intention that this order could be interpreted in two ways and the reason may be that in the first place, it centravenes international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in commanding officers.

It was very difficult for me as senior officer of the Flotilla to ask for clarification of this order from the Commander in Chief U-boats since while I was senior officer (15.6.41 - 5.5.45) I could only, swing to lack of time, visit the Commander in Chief U-boats four

or five times. I could not discuss this order with officers on my staff as all messages in officers' cypher might only be received by me. I was moreover of the opinion that commanding officers who were uncertain as to the meaning of this particular point always had the opportunity ( an opportunity which they often took on other points) to obtain a clear understanding of this point when they went for their instructions to the staff of Commander in Chief U-boats itself; these instructions by the staff of the Commander in Chief U-boats were for the great part given by very young officers with much more recent operational experience than I had - the officers on Commander in Chief U-boats' staff changed frequently. Generally speaking, with very few exceptions, commanding officers received their instructions from the staff of Commander in Chief U-boats after I myself had given them their instructions. Commanding officers were generally speaking in much closer personal contact with these young staff officers then they were with myself as senior officer of a purely transit flotilla. There were many commanding officers whom I only saw and got to know for a few days in Kiel while they were fitting their boats out for operations.

Having given considerable thought to the whole of this matter I now remember that during one of my visits to Commander in Chief U-boats' staff in the winter of 1942/3 or the summer '43, one of the staff officers, Korvettenkapitaen MESSLER or perhaps more likely Korvettenkapitaen KUPPISCH, with whom because of very close ties of friendship I used to converse intimately as long as he was with Commander in Chief U-boats' staff, told me of the following occurence ( whether I broached the subject or how the matter came up I can no longer remember).

A type VII boat ( 500-tonner) reported in her war log that when outward bound from a base in France she met far out in the Bay of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to take them on board owing to shortage of room ( she had a complement of 54 and carried full provisions for 1½ weeks). The boat therefore proceeded without taking any notice of the survivors.

This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the Commander in Chief U-boats' staff. It was stated that she would have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was highly possible that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a German U-boat.

This occurence made the views of the Commander in Chief U-boats clear to me.

As concerns making the order known to commanding officers: the order was always passed on during a commanding officers' conference while their boats were having their final overhaul or while they were being fitted out in Kiel for operational patrols; during these conferences I passed on to commanding officers once again all important orders about the equipping of their boats, procedure on departure, in home waters and while in convoy to Norway. Operational orders were not given by the flotilla; they were always given by the Commander in Chief U-boats himself or by Captain U-boats West on his behalf.

I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with more or less the following words: - "I have now to inform you of a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September 1942 gave the following order in an 'officers only' signal ( ..... the exact words of the order were then read out)."

"Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any further discussion on this point.

Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer somewhat as follows: -

H1163 - 0045

H1163 - 0046

I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave this order, by reference to the following event": I then mentioned the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay together with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by Commander in Chief U-boats' staff. I then went on to say, " Gentlemen, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with own consciences. The safety of your own boat must always remain your prime consideration.

Since the introduction of total underwater war ("Schnorchel"), I have in this connection in various ways further stated that commanding officers were in a much easier position in this respect since they had no occasion to surface and that the order was therefore illusory for them. They had to keep clear of everything which was not worth the firing of a torpedo.

I also remember that many commanding officers after the order of September 1942 had been read said, " That is quite clear and unequivocal however hard it may be". Had this order been given to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger my own boat by acting in this way, ( i.e., by shooting at life-boats).

If therefore U-boat commanding officers state that they had received from me the order to destroy life-boats, this does not correspond with the facts, but they received from me quite insufficiently clearly expressed instructions from the High Command together with my personal views thereon.

Before the order of September 1942 was issued I never discussed this difficult question at a commanding officers' conference and the subject of conduct towards survivors was never broached.

B. Conduct Towards Neutral and Hospital Ships

On this matter, which I treated together with what has gone before, I gave commanding officers the following directions:

There was an express order of the High Command, and Commander in Chief U-boats was adamant on this point and would relentlessly pursue the breach of it by court martial ( i.e., he insisted on the order being strictly obeyed), that no neutral or Red Cross ship might be molested even if the enemy misused neutral flags or the Red Cross.

The political results of sinking a neutral were much more serious than would have been the usefulness of the tonnage sunk.

I told commanding officers for their guidance in doubtful cases- in bad visibility, when neutral markings were not distinct, etc. - that it was better to allow five enemy vessels to go free than to sink one neutral.

So far as concerns the stopping and examination of neutrals, an order was made in January 1944 that in particular Spanish and Portuguese steamers in the North and Central Atlantic were to be stopped and examined for contraband and members of enemy nations of military age. I told commanding officers " Don't touch them. Stay underwater. You are endangering yourselves too much by that because you will certainly be reported by wireless and we know from experience that when such examinations are made watchfulness is liable to suffer. You are only exposing yourself to the danger of being surprised. If a ship carries neutral markings let it go by unscathed."

Objection was often made that German hospital ships had often been destroyed by the enemy, as German propaganda had stressed for years. My answer was: That does not matter, however unpleasant it may be. The order of the High Command is decisive and binding. Politics come before warfare.

H1163 - 0047



C. Rendering of Reports.

There was an order - I do not remember whether it was in the form of a written or verbal instruction - that no events during a war patrol which contravened established international agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war logs and were available to many authorities; there was always the danger therefore that events of this nature would become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of propagand. that this should be so.

Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were invariably made after every patrol to Commander in hief U-boats or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats.

I also gave the commanding officers instructions on this point.

To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942 appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had however to carry out the command to pass on this order to commanding officers for their instruction.

During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that he was therefore unable to carry it out.

An order of this nature was never given by me, i.e. on my own initiative, and could not be given by me since, had I exceeded my authority in so serious a way, I would immediately and without question have been relieved.

(signed) Moehle

Korvettenkapitaan

I, C.W. BEDFORD 110561, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 382-PS.

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H1163 - 0048

Extract from B.d.U. War Diary under heading:

17th. September 1942

"2. The attention of all Commanding Officers is again drawn to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and Chief Engineers still stand."

(3837)

H1163 – 0049

Exhibit GB 203
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

NID 24/T 11/45

D 645

SECRET

THE SINKING OF THE "NOREEN MARY"

1. Extract from War Diary of U 247

2. Comment of Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote.

0-oOo-0

NID 24

26.6.45.

(3539)

46

H1163 - 0050

NID 24/T 11/45 SECRET

## The sinking of the "Noreen Mary"

This fishing vessel was sunk by U 247 (Commander - Oberleutnant zur See Matschulst) on July 5th, 1944, when the U-boat was on her first operational patrol.

The following is the entry in the Commander's War Diary reporting the action:

1. 5. 7.

1945

Fishing vessel----------(position)
Two-fan from tubes I and IV.
(Firing details)
Vessel turns away to starboard shortly after the shot and takes up a position of 180°.
The sea being as smooth as a mill-pond, she probably saw the tracks.

2055 AM 3683 (i.e. position on German Naval Grid)

Surfaced.

Fishing Vessels: (Bearings given of 3 ships).
Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes.
T3a sinking shot fired from tube III at the "Noreen Mary" as she lay stopped.
(Particulars of range, angle, etc.)
A miss, misfired, did not clear.
Sunk by flak, with shots into her side.

2151 West of Cape Wrath

Sank by the stern. ---

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(3540)

H1163 – 0051

2. Comment of the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote on the War Diary of U 247 (Matschulst) for the period 18.5 - 28.7.44.

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The sinking by flak of the fishing vessel in this area testifies to great offensive spirit and verve. As regards the sinking shot on the fishing vessel as she lay stopped, I should say that relatively more misses are scored when firing sinking than attacking shots, as the enemy, when lying stopped, is usually still slightly moving. - Operations well carried out in difficult conditions.

Recognised Success: Fishing vessel "Noreen Mary" sunk by flak.

For the B.d.U.-
The Chief of Operational Division.

(Initials)

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NID 24

26.6.45.

(3538)

H1163 - 0052

# AFFIDAVIT BY JAMES MACALISTER.

AT EDINBURGH the Twenty first day of December Nineteen hundred and forty five in presence of William Brunton Robertson, Solicitor and Notary Public, Edinburgh

COMPEARED JAMES MACALISTER, 21 Adelphi Place, Portobello, who being solemnly sworn and interrogated DEPONES:-

I am 35 years of age.

I am at present employed as a Ships Rigger with John Dinwoodie, Granton, near Edinburgh. I have been a fisherman and a whaler practically all my days. In the month of July 1944 I was deckhand in the Steam Trawler "Noreen Mary" - a boat engaged in fishing on the west coast of Scotland and it follows from what I have said that I was engaged in a peacetime occupation just as I had been engaged in that occupation for many years before. I was not engaged in combating the enemy, although it is the case that the "Noreen Mary" carried - like all other fishing trawlers - a gun - in this case a "Savage Lewis". In addition there was one rifle on board for the purpose of exploding enemy mines which might happen to be in the Fairway; the vessel was not "wiped".

On the last fishing trip of the "Noreen Mary" (from Ayr to the fishing grounds off Butt of Lewis) there were ten of a crew - the skipper (John Flockhart), the mate (Alexander Barnett) second fisherman (Alexander Mackenzie) gutter (an Englishman whose name I forget) chief engineer (William Jackson) second engineer (William Pryde) fireman (George Gordon) trimmer (whose name I forget) cook (Charles Lindsay) and myself, a deck hand.

We had on board a catch of 325 boxes of fish.

We left Ayr at 14 hrs on 1st July 1944 proceeding independently for the fishing grounds off the butt of Lewis. We started to trawl early on Monday morning 3rd July at which time there were two other trawlers present. We continued to fish in the same area, with other trawlers joining up, until by the 5th of July there were five other trawlers in our vicinity.

Nothing of incident occurred until 2010 hrs on the 5th July, when, whilst on watch I saw two torpedoes pass down on our port side. They were together between 6 and 8 feet apart, the nearest being about 10ft from the ship's side. Then I saw a conning tower dead astern only 120/130 yards away, so I ran on to the bridge and called all hands. The ship's head was swinging to the S.E. (i.e. to starboard) at this time.

By the time the crew arrived on deck the conning tower had submerged, and they would not believe that I had seen either the submarine or the torpedoes. In fact the Mate asked "What pub have you been in". We carried on fishing until 2030 hrs when we hauled in our trawl and shot it again at 2055 hrs. The Mate then asked another trawler "Starbank" if she had seen anything of a submarine, but she had not.

At 2110 hrs. while we were still trawling, the submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yds to the N.E. of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the ship with a maching gun. were 18 miles West from Cape Wrath, on a north-westerly course (approx., making 3 knots. The weather was fine and clear, sunny, with good visibility; the sea was smooth, with light airs.

(3948)

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When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the conning tower. The Skipper thought at first the submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the weight off gear, and increased to full speed which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed 2 or 3 men, including the Skipper, who were on deck and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and stopping the ship.

By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle rould ahead of the vessel and passed down her port side with both guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the time but did not catch fire.

The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the waterline for shelter. The ship was listing more and more to port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the water.

I swam around until I can across the broken bow of our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only 60/70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine had been firing her guns for a full hour.

Shortly afterwards I saw the Second Engineer hanging on to a big pond board, and seeing the ship's ladder nearby, I pushed one end of it over to him. He grabbed it and I was able to pull him over to the damaged lifeboat and lay him over the top. He was very badly injured and became hysterical; he shook hands with me and said he was going to jump overboard, so the only thing I could do to prevent him doing so was hit him on the jaw to make him unconscious. After ten minutes he recovered, and was much quieter.

The Chief Engineer and an apprentice Trimmer were the other two men thrown clear of the ship, but I did not actually see them in the water I heard them shouting for a time, but they were not seen again.

The Second Engineer and I remained on the upturned lifeboat, and at daybreak I saw a trawler about half a mile away, and after asking the Second Engineer if he could shout, to which he answered "yes", I said "Well, if you've ever shouted in your life, shout now". We made as much noise as we could, and were heard by the crew of this trawler, which was H.M.T. "Lady Madeleine" who closed and lowered a boat and had us aboard about 0500/6. We searched the area, which was littered with wreckage for other survivors for about an hour, but did not see any sign of life.

Whilst on board the "Lady Madeleine" the Second Engineer and I had our wounds dressed; I learned later that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½" long embedded in his body. I think the shells must have been filled with this wire, as it definitely was not any part of the ship's equipment. I had 14 shrapnel wounds.

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The submarine was the largest I have seen, and she had a large conning tower. She had two big guns, one on the after deck and the other on the fore part of the conning tower. There was what looked like an Oerlikon (it was bigger than a machine gun) on a stand on the fore deck, but I was not able to see how many men fired it. The paintwork looked fresh and there was no camouflage on deck. The hull was a lightish grey, and I saw a black Swastika, picked out in white on the fore part of the conning tower. Underneath the Swastika there was a "U" and underneath that "11"; this number, which was also seen by the trawlers "Starbank", "Colleague" and "W. H. Podd", was painted in white. I did not see a crest. There was a peculiar erection on the bows of the submarine, which looked to me something like a catapult. It was a heavy structure, but only 2 or 3 ft high. I do not think it was part of a net cutter.

I saw two or three of the crew on the conning tower, and a man at the heavy gun, but did not notice their uniform. I would not be able to identify any of them, as I was constantly taking cover. Nobody on board the submarine spoke at any time.

I understand that the "Starbank" which was in our immediate vicinity when the submarine surfaced, immediately began transmitting an S.O.S. message. The submarine evidently heard her doing so, and fired two shots in her direction, but they missed and she was able to get away. The other trawlers also cut their gear and steamed at full speed for Stornoway.

This is my fourth war-time experience, having served in the Whalers "Sylvester" (mined) and "New Seville" (torpedoed), and the Trawler "Ocean Tide", which ran ashore.

As a result of this attack by the U. Boat, the casualties were six killed - (the skipper, mate, one deckhand, second fisherman, cook and fireman) - two missing (chief engineer and trimmer) - two injured (second engineer and myself).

ALL WHICH IS TRUTH as the Deponent shall answer to God.

(signed) JAMES MACALISTER.

Labore

W. B. Robertson.
Notary Public, Edinburgh.



(3950)

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Exhibit GB 204
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

H1163 - 0055

D.647.

EXTRACT FROM A STATEMENT GIVEN BY SENHOR JOSE RENATO DE OLIVEIRA SILVA, SECOND OFFICER OF THE SHIP "ANTONICO" WHICH WAS TORPEDOED, SET AFIRE AND SUNK ON THE 28TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1942, ON THE COAST OF FRENCH GUIANA.

"JOSE RENATO DE OLIVEIRA SILVA, of Brazilian Nationality, married, twenty six years of age (26), son of MANOEL EUCLIDES DE OLIVEIRA SILVA e DONA OLERINA DE OLIVEIRA SILVA, Second Pilot, matriculated by the Port Authorities of Rio de Janeiro, resident in that city, Avenida Sao Jeronimo 795. After being sworn in, he was questioned by the head of the Inquiry Board as follows: "Where was he at the time the ship "Antonico" was attacked by the submarine?". He answered he was in the galley. When asked what he knew as regards the incident he answered that he was Second Officer of the ship "Antonico" of this city, and the property of the firm M.L. D'ALBUQUERQUE, which left this port on the ninth (9th) of September last, with the port of PARAMARIBO, DUTCH GUIANA, as destination; the ship "Antonico" being commanded by CAPITAO DE CABOTAGEM AMERICO DE MOREIRA NEVES; that the "Antonico" was coasting by various wood ports, the last one being in RIO OIAPOQUE, and then on to PARAMARIBO; that the voyage was running normally, until the 28th of the same month of September, when, at almost four ten, (4H10') finding himself on duty in the galley with the sailor JONAS BARBOSA, the witness heard a burst of gunfire, which drew his attention and he saw a luminous ball of fire, passing from starboard to portside, close to the galley of the "Antonico"; he immediately stopped the engines, and swung to port, in order to avoid that the "Antonico" should be hit again by another projectile. There were five more shots, but all missed their mark; The witness immediately realised that the "Antonico" was being attacked by an Axis submarine, due to the ship carrying material to an Allied Air Base; that the ship "Antonico" was completely disarmed, including the crew; that after the first shots which missed their mark, the attack continued, hitting the "Antonico" in several places, and setting her alight in various parts, as the shots were luminous and incendiary; that the Captain of the "Antonico" at the moment of the attack was in bed; that the witness, seeing that the "Antonico" was on fire, gave orders to the sailor in charge of the steering wheel, who was with him, to go to his appointed place, in case of abandon ship; that the witness also went to his lifeboat No. 2 and found all the crew at their posts; the witness saw the Captain of the "Antonico" on deck, giving orders and directing abandon ship, when he spoke rapidly to the witness saying "I never thought that this would happen"; the witness continued on his way and gave orders to swing out lifeboat No. 2 for himself and his crew of 20, the word crew is used, but already the crew had diminished, having fallen as victims to the shots and splinters of the grenades of the aggressors; that the witness saw the dead on the deck of the "Antonico" as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the "Antonico" in order to avoid being dragged down by the same "Antonico" and also because she was the agressors target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the "Antonico" lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machine gunned the defenceless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot ARNALDO DE ANDRADE DE LIMA, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard, to save themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 metres in distance from the submarine, and on this occasion the witness saw her for the first time; that she was in the dark, and thus it was impossible for him to identify her; that at that time the witness was completely ignorant of the fate of the lifeboat commanded by the Captain of the "Antonico"; that the submarine immediately withdrew from the locality and submerged, after the "Antonico" in flames, disappeared; that from the start of the attack until the end of same, and the disappearance

D.647.

of the "Antonico" the time passed was more or less twenty (20) minutes; that it was not yet daylight, and the locality in darkness; that the witness decided to remain in the same locality until daylight; that this lifeboat was overflowing but having floats, it did not submerge and the witness and his companions were able to occupy her; that when daylight came, the witness saw the lifeboat commanded by the Captain of the "Antonico" about 50 metres away; that the other lifeboat was also overflowing, but also had floats, but the prow was missing, having been destroyed by a grenade; that only then was the witness obvious to the fact that the Captain of the "Antonico" had been killed with four others by a grenade which destroyed the prow of the lifeboat; that in that lifeboat there were seven (7) wounded men, and in the lifeboat of the witness, five of the crew were wounded.

I, Richard Long, Lieutenant Commander, R.N.V.R., certify that the above is an extract from a report in the possession of the British Admiralty, London.

Richard Long

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H1163 - 0057

Exhibit GB 205
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

D. 646/a

FRIESLAND 1875 m IN ENGLISH FOR U.K. 15.35 (4 mins) 11.3.43.

Talk by Naval War Reporter: A New Story of the Battle of the Atlantic

Windjammer Sunk by U-Boat

Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters - dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the coloured people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-Boat ope ating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage, lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain and America.

3830.

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H1163 - 0058

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. D-646/b

Extract from War Diary of U - 105, dated 12.1.43.

12.1.

0100 hours — I steer towards the sailing vessel from the lee-side, as he cannot see me then because of his sails. I shoot with the 2 cm gun into his rigging. He thereupon fires into the wind. He then goes apparently unintentionally over to the other bow. 2 boats and a raft are then lowered into the water. I move close up, and order handgrenades to be thrown on board. There are still quite a number of people on board; far too many for such a small vessel. She is still afloat, shows no change as yet.

0127 hours — The sailing vessel suddenly heels over to one side and sinks. Men are swimming in the water, I estimate there must have been 50 - 60 men aboard all told. To the question "What cargo"? the reply "No cargo, workmen" is received. Therefore he seems to have had workmen on board.

Position Mar Qu ED 5956

0134 hours — Moved away with course set at 147° and both engines at half speed ahead.

0215 hours — Have gone over to both engines slow speed ahead.

H1163-0059

Exhibit GB-206
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2098-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 215

Decree
relating to the Status of the Supreme Commanders
of the Army and Navy
of 25 Feb 1938

Erlass
ueber die Stellung der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres
und der Kriegsmarine
von 25 Febr. 38

The Supreme Commander of the Army, General von Brauchitsch, carries the equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich - as has already been the case with the Supreme Commander of the Navy, Admiral Dr. h.c. Raeder

Following my orders, the Supreme Commanders of the Army and Navy shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.

Order No. 461 of April 20, 1936 (Heeresverordnungsblatt page 163) is rescinded -

Munich, 25 Feb 1938

Der Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister and Chief of the
Reich Chancellery

Dr Lammers

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2098-PS

10 November 194[illegible]

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Nr. 2098-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5, 33812169

(3309)

H1163-0060

Exhibit GB 207
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

D.648.

N.I.D. 24/T.234/45

CONFIDENTIAL.

LIST OF MEETINGS WITH HITLER AT WHICH ADMIRAL DOENITZ WAS PRESENT.

1. 8.2.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Wolfsschanze. Those present were: Admiral Krancke and Reichsminister Speer.

2. 26.2.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Fuehrer's H.Q. Winniza. Those present were: Admiral Krancke, General Jodl, Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer.

3. 14.3.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Wolfsschanze. Those present were: Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring, Generaloberst Jeschonnek, General Jodl, Konteradmiral Machens, Konteradmiral Voss, Konteradmiral Wagner, Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer.

4. 18.3.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Wolfsschanze. Those present were: Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, General Jodl, Konteradmiral Voss, Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer.

5. 11.5.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Berghof. Those present were: Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer.

6. 14.5.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Wolfsschanze. Kapitän zur See Engelhardt was present.

7. 31.5.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Berghof. Those present were: Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, General-leutnant Warlimont, Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer.

8. 15.6.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Berghof. Those present were: Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Generalleutnant Warlimont, Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer, Reichsminister Speer.

9. 8.7.43. Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Wolfsschanze. Those present were: Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, General Jodl, Konteradmiral Voss, Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer.

10. 17.7.43 Meeting between Hitler and Doenitz at Wolfsschanze. Those present were: General Jodl, Konteradmiral Voss, Kapitan zur See von Puttkamer, Oberst I.G. Scherf and Generalfeldmarschall Rommel.

11. 26.7.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler was attended by Konteradmiral Machens, Kapitän-leutnant Hansen-Nootbar, Konteradmiral Wagner, Korvetten Kapitän Freywald.

12. 27.7.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler. The above were again present.

13. 28.7.43 Meeting continued and was attended by Konteradmiral Wagner. Korvetten Kapitän Freywald.

14. 1.8.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler at Hitler's headquarters.

/15. 2.8.43.....

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15. 2.8.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler continues, they were joined later by Konteradmiral Meendsen-Bohlken.

16. 3.8.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler continues. General Jodl also present at conference.
Luftwaffen-ingenieur Dessauer was interviewed by the Fuehrer in the afternoon.

17. 9.8.43 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters.
Konteradmiral Wagner and Kapitän-leutnant Hausen-Nootbar
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Reichsmarschall Goering, Reischsfuehrer S.S. Himmler, Feldmarschall Keitel, Ambassador Hevel, Konteradmiral Wagner, Konteradmiral Voss, Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer were also present.

18. 10.8.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler continues.
General Jodl present.

19. 11.8.43. Meeting continues.
Those present include Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, General Jodl, Himmler, Ribbentrop, General Student, Ambassador Hevel, Kapitän zur See von Kamptz, Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer, Oberst I.G. Scherff.

20. 19.8.43 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters.
Those present were: General Jodl, Konteradmiral Wagner, Konteradmiral Voss, Kapitän-leutnant Hansen-Nootbar.

21. 28.8.43 Discussion at Hitler's headquarters.
Those present were: Doenitz, Vizeadmiral Meisel, Kapitän zur See Rehm, Kapitän-leutnant Hansen-Nootbar, Leutnant (MA) Dr. Raudszus, General Jodl, Chief of Army General Staff, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop.

22. 29.8.43 Discussion continued.
Those present include: Himmler, Goering, General Korten, General Meister.

23. 10.9.43. Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters.
Those present were: Konteradmiral Wagner, Konteradmiral Baltzer, Kapitän-leutnant Hausen-Nootbar, Goering, General Korten, Feldmarschall Keitel and Himmler.

24. 11.9.43 Conference between Doenitz and Hitler.
Those present during the day were: Feldmarschall Keitel, Reichsinnenminister Himmler, Ribbentrop.

25. 12.9.43 Conference continues.

26. 24.10.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler at Fuehrer's headquarters.
Those present during the day were: Generalfeldmarschall Frhr von Weichs and General Korten.

27. 27.10.43. Discussion with Hitler at Wolfsschauze.
Those present were: Doenitz, Reichmarschall Goering, Feldmarschall Keitel, General Jodl, General Oberst Guderian, Kapitän zur See Frhr von Wangenheim, General Korten, Oberst Christian and WFST/Op M (name not known).

/28. 25.11.43.....

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28. 25.11.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler at Wolfsschanze. Those present were: Reichsmarshall Goering, Feldmarschall Keitel.

29. 26.11.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler at Wolfsschanze continued. Those present were again: Reichsmarshall Goering, and Feldmarschall Keitel.

30. 19.12.43 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler at Wolfsschanze.

31. 20.12.43 Meeting between Doentiz and Hitler at Wolfsschanze.

32. 1.1.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters "Wolfsschanze" Those present were: Minister Speer, Reichsmarschall Goering.

33. 2.1.44 The above meeting was continued and the same were present.

34. 3.1.44 The above meeting was continued and the same were again present.

35. 18.1.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters "Wolfsschanze". Those present were: Konteradmiral Wagner and General Jodl, Feldmarschall Kesselring.

36. 19.1.44 Visit by Doenitz on Hitler's headquarters "Wolfsschanze". Those present were: Konteradmiral Wagner and General Jodl.

37. 26.2.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof. Those present were: Feldmarschall Keitel and Vegelein, representative of Reichsfuehrer S.S. Himmler.

38. 27.2.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof continues. Doenitz took part in a discussion with Marshall Antonescu.

39. 20.3.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters "Wolfsschanze". Gauleiter Kaufmann was present.

40. 21.3.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters "Wolfsschanze" continues.

41. 12.4.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof. Those present were: General Jodl and Reichsmarschall Goering.

42. 13.4.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's Headquarters at the Berghof. Those present were: General Jodl and Reichsmarschall Goering.

43. 4.5.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof. Reichsmarschall Goering was amongst those present.

44. 5.5.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof continues. Reichsmarschall Goering was amongst those present.

45. 6.5.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof continues. Reichsmarschall Goering was probably again present.

46. 12.6.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof. Those present were: Reichsleiter Bormann, Konteradmiral von Puttkamer, Konteradmiral Voss, Konteradmiral Wagner, Feldmarschall Keitel, General Jodl.

/47. 9.7.44.....

H1163-0063



47. 9.7.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters, Wolfsschanze. Those present were: Feldmarschall Model, General Friesner, General oberst von Greim, Reichsfuehrer S.S. Himmler, Feldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl and General Korten.

48. 29.6.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof accompanied by: Konteradmiral Wagner, Korvettenkapitän Hansen-Nootbar, also present were Feldmarschall von Rundstedt, Feldmarschall Rommel, Feldmarschall Keitel, General oberst Jodl, Reichsmarshall Goering and Feldmarschall Sperrle.

49. 30.6.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof continues. The above were probably again present and also Foreign minister von Ribbentrop.

50. 1.7.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters continues. The above were probably again present.

51. 11.7.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at the Berghof. Those present were: Konteradmiral Wagner, Korvetten-Kapitän Hansen-Nootbar.

52. 12.7.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at Berghof. Those present were: General Korten and General Buhle Konteradmiral Wagner, Korvetten Kapitän Hansen-Nootbar.

53. 13.7.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters at Berghof continues. Those present were: Feldmarschall Keitel, Reichsfuehrer S.S. Himmler, Konteradmiral Wagner and Korvetten Kapitän Hansen-Nootbar.

54. 20.7.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters accompanied by Konteradmiral Wagner, Korvetten Kapitän Hansen-Nootbar.

55. 21.7.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters continues. The above were again present.

56. 13.10.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters Wolfsschanze accompanied by Konteradmiral Wagner and Kapitän-leutnant Lüdde-Neurath.
Reichsfuehrer S.S.Himmler, Kpt.zur See Conrady, S.S. Gruppenfuehrer Vegelein, State counsellor Johst, Obersturmbannfuehrer Grontmann, Generaloberst Jodl, Feldmarschall Keitel, Reichsmarschall Goering, Reichsminister Speer, were also present during the day.

57. 14.10.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters Wolfsschanze continues. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Reichsfuehrer S.S. Himmler, Konteradmiral Wagner, Kapitän-leutnant Lüdde-Neurath, Reichsmarschall Goering were amongst those present.

58. 31.10.44 Visit by Doenitz accompanied by Konteradmiral Wagner and Kapitän-leutnant Lüdde-Neurath to Hitler's headquarters "Wolfsschanze". Those present were: Feldmarschal Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl, Konteradmiral Voss.

59. 1.11.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters "Wolfsschanze". Those present were: Konteradmiral Wagner and Kapitän-leutnant Lüdde-Neurath. Konteradmiral Voss, Generaloberst Jodl, Chef O.K.W. (Keitel), Reichleiter Bormann.

/60. 2.11.44.....

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60. 2.11.44 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters Wolfsschanze continues. Those present were: Reichsminister Speer, Konteradmiral Wagner, Kapitän-leutnant Ludde-Neurath, S.S. Gruppenfuehrer Vegelein, Konteradmiral Voss.

61. 28.11.44 Doenitz attended situation conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellory.

62. 30.11.44 Doenitz attended Conference with Hitler. General-leutnant Wenck was present.

63. 3.12.44 Meeting between Doenitz and Hitler. Konteradmiral Wagner was present.

64. 10.12.44 Doenitz attended situation conference with Hitler. Konteradmiral Wagner was present.

65. 1.1.45 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters. Those present were Konteradmiral Wagner and Korvetten Kapitän Lüdde-Neurath.

66. 2.1.45 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters continues. Those present were Konteradmiral Wagner and Korvetten Kapitän Lüdde-Neurath.

67. 3.1.45 Visit by Doenitz to Hitler's headquarters continues. Those present were Konteradmiral Wagner and Korvetten Kapitän Lüdde-Neurath.

68. 18.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference.

69. 19.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference also present were: Generaloberst Jodl, Reichskommisar Terboven, General Keitel, Chef W.F. St. (?)

70. 20.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference. Also present were: Feldmarshal Keitel, Reichskommisar Terboven and the representative for coal and transport services.

71. 21.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference.

72. 22.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference. Reichsleiter Bormann and General der Infanterie Krebs present.

73. 23.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference. Those present were: Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Reichsmarschall Goering, Feldmarschall Keitel, Minister Lammers, Generaloberst Jodl, Reichsleiter Bormann.

74. 24.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference.

75. 25.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference. Chef W.F.St. (Jodl ?) was present.

76. 26.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference. Reichsminister Speer was present.

77. 28.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference. Kapitän zur See Assmann present.

78. 30.1.45 Doenitz attended situation conference. Feldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl present also General der Artillerie Burgdorff (Chef H.P.A.)

/79. 31.1.45.....

(61)

H1163-0065



79. 31.1.45 Situation conference probably attended by Doenitz.

80. 1.2.45 Doenitz attended situation conference. General-leutnant Wenck and Feldmarschall Keitel were present.

81. 2.2.45 This situation conference was attended by Doenitz. S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer Jüttner was present.

82. 3.2.45 This situation conference was attended by Doenitz. General-Leutnant Wenck was present.

83. 5.2.45 This situation conference was attended by Doenitz. Feldmarschall Keitel and Generaloberst Jodl were present.

84. 8.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.

85. 9.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. The following were present: Oberstleutnant von Greiff, General-leutnant Winter, Konteradmiral Wagner, Standartenfuehrer Zander.

86. 11.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Those present were: Feldmarschall Keitel, General-leutnant Winter.

87. 14.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Also present were: Generaloberst Guderian, S.S.Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein, Kapitän zur See Assmann.

88. 15.2.45 Situation conference. Those present were: Feldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl, Kapitän zur See Assmann, Generaloberst Guderian.

89. 17.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Also present were: Reichsmarschall Goering, Generaloberst Guderian, Chief of the Operational Staff of the Air Force.

90. 19.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Also present were: Generaloberst Jodl, S.S.Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein, Oberstleutnant I.G. Hermani.

91. 20.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Generaloberst Jodl, Ambassador Hewel were present.

92. 23.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Also present were: Oberst v. Below, Oberstleutnant i.G. v. Greiff, and Major Buchs.

93. 26.2.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Also present were: Kapitän zur See von Assmann, General leutnant Winter, S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner, S.S.Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, Oberstleutnant von Greiff, General Burgdorff.

94. 27.2.45 Situation conference attended by Dönitz. Also present were: S.S. Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein, General leutnant Winter, Generaloberst Guderian.

95. 1.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Also present were: Kapitän zur See Assmann, Generaloberst Jodl, and Standartenfuehrer Zander.

96. 3.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.

/97. 4.3.45.....

H1163 - 0066



97. 4.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Generaloberst Guderian was present.

98. 6.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.

99. 8.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Generaloberst Jodl and Generaloberst Guderian were present.

100. 9.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Reichsmarschall Goering and Chief of the Operation Staff of the Air Force were present.

101. 10.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Feldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl and Generaloberst Guderian were present.

102. 12.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
General der Infanterie Krebs and Feldmarschall Keitel present.

103. 13.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
General der Artillerie Buhle and Chief of the Operational Staff of the Air Force present.

104. 16.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Feldmarschall Keitel, Generaloberst Guderian and Generalfeldmarschall Busch were present.

105. 17.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Generaloberst Guderian and Reich Commissioner for Shipping present.

106. 18.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Generaloberst Jodl, Minister Speer, S.S. Standartenfuehrer Zander and Generaloberst Guderian were present.

107. 20.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Generaloberst Jodl, General der Artillerie Buhle and Konteradmiral Wagner were present.

108. 21.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.

109. 23.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Generaloberst Guderian was present.

110. 25.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
General der Infanterie Krebs was present.

111. 26.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Feldmarschall Keitel, General leutnant Winter and Generaloberst Guderian were present.

112. 28.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Feldmarschall Keitel was present.

113. 30.3.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Feldmarschall Keitel, General der Infanterie Krebs and General Buhle were present.

14. 1.4.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
General der Infanterie Krebs was present.

15. 3.4.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.
Generaloberst Jodl was present.

/116. 4.4.45.....

H1163 - 0067



116. 4.4.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Generaloberst Jodl and General der Infanterie Krebs were present.

117. 7.4.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Feldmarschall Keitel and Generaloberst Jodl present.

118. 8.4.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz.

119. 10.4.45 Situation conference attended by Doenitz. Generaloberst Jodl was present.

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I, Richard Long, Lieutenant Commander, R.N.V.R. certify that, in the course of registering captured documents, I have compiled from them the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned.

I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined and which are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London.

Richard Long

Lieutenant Commander, R.N.V.R.
2nd January, 1945.

H1163-0068

3131

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C.178
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SEC24-10/C.178.

Berlin, 11. 2. 1943

Naval War Staff
New : Reg. No. 1. Skl Ii 446/43 Top Secret
requested by : 3rd Skl. 1219 g. of 2/1/43.

Top Secret

Pencil note : I suggest informing Chief 3/SKL-Ic - the subordinate commanders are informed.

Top Secret,
to be transmitted by officer courier.

I) Via
Ia
to be shown to 1./SKL (Naval War Staff).

SUBJECT : Treatment of Saboteurs :

From the notice given by 3/SKL (Naval War Staff) on February 1st 43 it has been discovered that the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone enquiry at 3/SKL proved that this Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of this situation, reference is made to figure 6) of the Fuehrer order of October 18, 42. (Appendix to volume No. 1. SKL I Ops 26 367/42 Top Secret of October 28. 42) according to which all commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.

The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18. 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1. SKL. 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of October 27.42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely because it is stated therein :

1). That, according to the Fuehrer's views the spreading of military sabotage organisations in the East and West may have portentous consequences for our whole conduct of the war and

2). That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.

On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is not at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy "Commando Operations" would not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of action which has been ordered.

Practical difficulties may develop because of the definition of the term "sabotage units". The annihilation instructions, according to figure 5 of the Fuehrer order of October 18, 1942. do not apply to troops participating in large scale landing operations and large scale air borne operations. The criterion is to be found in that in the latter case an open battle takes place, whereas, for instance, 10 or more people who land by sea or air or drop by parachute not to fight an open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge or a railway installation, would fall into the category of those who must be annihilated.

H1163 - 0069



It is to be assumed that Security III is acquainted with the Fuehrer order and will therefore reply accordingly to the objections of the Army General Staff and the Air Force Operations Staff. As far as the Navy, is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the C-in-C of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of commando units.

II) Ii

Ii

Translator's note : Initials unreadable.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-178

23 November 1945.

I, WALTER SELIGSON, 1st Lt., O-1558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-178.

WALTER SELIGSON
1st Lt.
O-1558904.

66

H1163-0070

Exhibit G3 208
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

D 649

# A F F I D A V I T

I, RICHARD ARTHUR LORAINE HILLARD, Barrister-at-Law, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was the Judge Advocate at the trial of Obersturmbannfuhrer Hans Wilhelm BLOMBERG, Obersturmbannfuhrer Hans KELLER, Obersturmfuhrer Georg Ludwig Werner OPPEL, Untersturmfuhrer Alfred KREUTZ, Obersturmfuhrer Erwin LANG, Rudolf Hermann Theodor KAPP, Willi Friedrick Reinhold TIEGE, Oberscharfuhrer George EBERL, Hauptscharfuhrer Friedrich Wilhelm EISENACHER, Obersturmfuhrer George MULLER, and Oberscharfuhrer SCHMIDT, by a Military Court held at the Law Courts, Oslo, Norway, which sat on Thursday, 29th November 1945 and concluded its sittings on Tuesday, 4th December, 1945.

2. The Court was convened by order of Major-General D.A.H.Graham, CB, CBE, DSO, MC, Commander, British Land Forces, Norway, and the President of the Court was Major-General C.H.Miller, CB, CBE, DSO. The prosecution was conducted by Major E.Steel, Legal Staff Officer, Deputy Judge Advocate General's Office, Oslo, and the accused were defended by a serving British officer.

3. The accused were charged with Committing a War Crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July, 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of Lt. A.H.Andresen, Petty Officer B.Kleppe, Leading Stoker A.Bigseth, Able Seaman J.Klipper, Able Seaman G.B.Hansen, and Able Seam K.Hals, Royal Norwegian Navy, and Leading Telegraphist R. Hull, Royal Navy, prisoners of war.

4. There was evidence before the Court which was notchallenged by the Defence that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo Boat.

5. The defence did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.

6. On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus where they had arrived by 11 p.m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Leut H.P.K.W.Fanger, a Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the West Coast. Leut. Fanger reported to the Officer in charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners-of-war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast.

7.The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuhrer of the SD. Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that
3855) time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a

H1163 - 0071



meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuhrer order of the 18th October, 1942, was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners-of-war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuhrer order, to the SD.

9. The SD then conducted their own interrogation which lasted the greater part of the 29th July. The official of the SD who carried out this interrogation stated at the trial that after the interrogation he was of the opinion that the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners-of-war, and that he so informed his superior officer. Despite this report and the representations of a superior officer, the crew were dealt with under the Fuhrer order and were executed. The execution was carried out early the next morning, each of the members of the crew being taken to a rifle range adjoining a concentration camp and there shot, one by one, by an execution squad composed of members of the SD.

10. Orders were asked for as to how the bodies should be disposed of, and the officer in charge of the execution party was ordered to dispose of the bodies secretly "in the usual way". He accordingly carried out this order by attaching a charge to each body and exploding it when the body was in the water.

11. It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an order from the Fuhrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as ordinary prisoners-of-war. This order referred specifically to the Fuhrer order referred to above.

SWORN by the said RICHARD ARTHUR LORAINE HILLARD at 6 Spring Gardens in the City of Westminster this 28th day of December, 1945,

(signed) R. A. L. HILLARD.

Before me

(signed) C. BUCKLEY.
A Commissioner for Oaths.

3356)

68

Exhibit USA 209
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

H1163 - 0072

C.158

Extracts from minutes of Hitler conference on 19.2.45.

Admiral (Special duties) attached to C in C of the Navy

Reg. No. 90/45 SO only

On active service
20.2.45.

SO only
Access only through Officer

Participation of the C-in-C Navy in Hitler's conference on the 19.2. at 1700 hours

Note: The C-in-C Navy was not present at the Hitler conference on 18.2.45.

1) The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but also the Western powers are violating International Law by their actions against the defenceless population and the residential districts of the towns, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and also through this measure to urge our people to resist to the utmost, The Fuehrer orders the C-in-C of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his opinion as soon as possible.

(Translator's note - The remaining paragraphs deal with air reconnaissance on allied transports, and problems in connection with the transportation of German troops).

2nd Extract: From minutes of a Hitler conference on 20.2.45.

Admiral (Special duties) attached to Ob.d.M.
Reg. No. 100/45 MOST SECRET. S.O. only

On active service
21.2.45.

SO only
Access only through officer

Participation of C-in-C Navy in a Hitler Conference on 20.2.45 at 1600 hours

The C-in-C of the Navy informed the Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff, General Jodl, and the representative for the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Fuehrer's H.Q., Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany's possible renunciation of the Geneva convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages: even from a general standpoint it appears to the C-in-C of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world.

The Chief of Armed Forces Ops Staff and Ambassador Hewel are in full agreement.

(Translator's note: The remaining paragraph deal with the importance of Swinemuende and Stettin. Both minutes are initialled by the Admiral (Special Duties) attached to the C-in-C of the Navy - initial unreadable).

DISTRIBUTION:

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" " 4 Chief of Naval Armament.
" " 5 Admiral at Fuehrer's Headquarters.
" " 6 Admiral (Special duties)

(3369)

H1163 - 0073

Exhibit - USA 210
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C.171
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF COUNSEL

Extract from Minutes of a meeting between the C-in-C of the Navy and the Fuehrer on 1.7.44. signed by Doenitz

"5(b) Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Courtmartial proceedings create martyrs. History shows, that the names of such men are on everybody's lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without courtmartial proceedings."

Translator's note: All other minutes deal with totally different matters.

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| KTB Teil C, Heft VII | Copy Nr. 3 |
| Copy 2 Order | Copy Nr. 4 |

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C.-171

29th November, 1945.

I, MAX MANLIN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-171.

MAX MANLIN

(3433)

70

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1

Exhibit GB 211
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

SEC24-10/C-193

Naval War Staff
Reg. No. 1/Naval War Staff Ib 3714/44 Most Secret S.O. only.

The Necessity for giving further support to the Navy and the Merchant Navy

Translator's note - Part I deals mainly with a review of German shipping losses and gives reasons for them. Part II suggests remedial measures and includes the following passage:

"Furthermore I propose reinforcing the ship-yard working parties by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of copper-smiths, especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert copper-smiths from the construction of locomotives - (which has been reduced) to shipbuilding."

Translator's note - the next paragraph gives further measures for improving the situation, and the document continues -

"A question of particular importance is the sabotage in the Danish and Norwegian ship-yards. For political reasons, sharp decisive action against this pest has not yet been taken. While the output of the Scandinavian dockyard workers only amounts to 75% of German production, there is absolutely no sense in having ships built abroad, using up our costly material and our scanty foreign currency, if, for example, out of every eight new ships in Denmark at the present moment, seven are sunk through sabotage.

The watch kept by military and security service sentries has, in spite of constant reinforcements, proved insufficient; above all, it has for so long not been thorough - e.g., the workers may not be searched for explosives on entering the shipyard. Measures for further action against saboteurs themselves are being introduced by the Security Police.

Should these not achieve their purpose, I request that the necessity for a change in the line of policy adopted towards Denmark and Norway be considered.

Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration. By the employment of the working parties concerned (wholly or in part) as concentration camp workers, their output would not only be increased to 100%, but the cessation of their previously good wages might possibly result in their being considerably deterred from sabotage, since it is probably carried out by hostile agitators, but only done with the tacit acquiescence of the workers.

There need no longer be grounds for anxiety regarding the disadvantages arising from strikes or the desertion of workers, if, due to sabotage continuing, the actual output of these workers is as low as at the present moment."

(3364)

H1163 - 0075



Translator's note - the paragraphs which follow urge the need for increased output of iron and steel and suggest measures for defensive action against attacks on shipping.

Item 2 of the summing-up reads -

"2) 12000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labour (security service agrees to this)."

(signed) DOENITZ

(3365)

H1163 - 0076

SEC24-10/C-195

C.195

MOST SECRET

Naval War Staff
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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The Fuehrer | Copy No. | 1 |
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| C-in-C of the Navy | " " | 3 |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Ops Staff | " " | 4 |
| Reich Minister Speer | " " | 5 - 8 |
| Reich Commissar for Shipping, Gauleiter Kaufmann | " " | 9 |
| Supreme Command of the Air Force, Air Force Ops Staff | " " | 10 |
| Admiral, Fuehrer's H.Q. | " " | 11 |
| Admiral, Special Duties | " " | 12 |
| Chief Adm. Qu. | " " | 13 |
| Chief of Naval Armaments | " " | 14 |
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| Naval Liaison Officer for Armaments and War Production, Korvettenkapitän Loewe | " " | 16 |
| 1 Div. Naval War Staff | " " | 17 |
| 2 Div. Naval War Staff/IIIa | " " | 18 |
| K.T.B. | " " | 19 |
| Spare | " " | 20 |

1) Chief of Naval War Staff 1/SXI (for attention)

2) To Ib. (ink-additions - Translator's note)

(3363)

73

H1163 - 0077

Exhibit GS 212
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

Translation of Document D-650.

Copy.

Enclosure 1.

KMA 23641/45 secret.

Secret Decree of Grand Admiral Doenitz of the 11.4.45.

I. The enemy has streamed deep into Germany. This fills everyone with sorrow. It is a matter of course that brains are occupying them-selves with this difficult situation. My opinion on this matter is as follows:-

1. Capitulation means for certain the occupation of the whole of Germany by our enemies along the lines of the partition discussed by them at Yalta. Therefore also the cession (to Russia) of further considerable parts of Germany the west of the Oder. Or does anyone think that at that stage the Anglo-Saxons will not keep to their agreements and will oppose a further advance of the Russian hordes into Germany with armed force, and begin a war with Russia for our sake? In this respect therefore the idea is wrong: not the Anglo-Saxons into the country, then at least the Russians will not come.

The occupation of the whole of Germany further means the conscription of German people throughout Germany for work, particularly in Russia but also in other enemy countries. The majority of these slave-labourers will be demanded by Russia, and she will get them too. Or does anyone think that for the sake of these German people the Anglo-Saxons will then start a war with Russia.

The capitulation further means Bolshevism in the Russian occupied territories, and with it the annihilation of all those elements amongst all classes of the population that are capable of resistance. In the territories occupied by the Anglo-Saxons, National-Socialism will be eliminated at one stroke. The result will be internal chaos and the self-mutilation of the German people. And those intellectual weaklings who think such thoughts of capitulating will be the first to perish or be taken away as slave workers. Or does anybody believe that they will be able to lead the life of peaceful citizens in such a starving chaotic Germany?

2. I turn against the short sighted weaklings who are incapable of forming a judgement - weaklings who say: "If we had not had National-Socialism, all this would not have happened". If we had not had National-Socialism, we would have got Communism, growing unemployment and internal political chaos in Germany in the 20s already. Without the rearmament which the Fuehrer brought us, Germany would have been overwhelmed by the Russians; or does anyone believe that the Russians would (in conformity with a code of chivalry) have come to a halt before Germany in his push for expansion to the west, simply because, owing to the smallness of our armed forces, composed of 100,000 men, we were incapable of defending ourselves?

3. I turn against the wiseacres who mention that we should have avoided war with Russia in 1941. If the leadership of the State had done this, the unweakened Russian would have overwhelmed us long ago, at a time which suited him, and then these same wiseacres would have said: " Of course, the leadership of the state should have taken preventive measures by attacking Russia in good time".

4. I turn against the dilettante strategists who say that we should have withdrawn to Germany in good time, when we would have had the arms and the forces at our disposal to defend ourselves. Quite wrong. Exactly the

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the opposite is true. In this war with longe range arms like the air force, space is of decisive importance for keeping the enemy as far away as possible from the home territory and from the home armaments. Further: every narrowing of space brings to the enemy too a shortening of his lines and thus a liberation of forces. The narrower the rings becomes, the greater the enemy pressure on the defence ring, and the greater the effectiveness of the enemy's action on the remaining space. So far for the fundamentals of this question. Over and above this, the evacuation of enemy territories is always accompanied by great losses, because the enemy does not after all stand by kindly, but presses after. He therefore gets more and better equipped forces freed for other uses than oneself. If the whole of the armed forces had grasped these problems fully, it would have been better.

5. Please do not worry about the laedership of the state not knowing the state of mind of the population. The Fuehrer knows more about the state of mind of the German population and has taken to heart and pondered the tasks of a leader (arising therefrom) in the field of home politics more than any of us soldiers. Please too be easy in your minds, and do not say too glibly that the whole bag of tricks must be changed completely, - that the C. in C of the Navy must now raise 3 Army Corps from the Navy, or remove the armaments from the ships and use them in the land fighting, or do something else. These things too have been discussed with the Fuehrer for a long time, and have been done in as far as the general war situation and existing facts allowed. I therefore have no use for all this unfruitful and brooding criticism. We should rather see the real facts clearly. Only the Fuehrer has for years realised with what danger Bolshevism threatens Europe. For this reason he eliminated our lack of unity and the vast unemployment, made us capable of defending ourselves and. like a preacher in the desert, tried to enlighten Europe on this subject. On the other side stands this Churchill, blibded by hatred, - the grave-digger of Britain as a great power, who entered the war to protect the Balance of Power in Europe and to fight for the freedom of the small nations. What remaons now of this Balance of Power, and what point has the freedom of the small nations reached?. Poland and all the other small states in Eastern Europe are provinces of Bolshevik Russia. At latest in the year, perhaps even this year, Europe will realise that Adolf Hitler is the only statesman of stature in Europe. All the negative hyper criticism is therefore unfruitful and false in its data. Since it is born of weakness, it cannot indeed be otherwise, since cowardice and weakness make people blind and stupid.

II. So it is not only our duty and honour as soldiers that command us to fight obediently, hard and faithfully, incapable of being led astray by anything, but every clear, intelligent reflection also tells us that this is the only way to better our position. Every action in the opposite direction will with all certainty prepare the way for dissolution and extermination and thus for certain destruction. Only by hard endurance are we in a position fully to exploit the military and political possibilities which are and can be in our favour, and to reap their fruits. We cannot speak about the former without realising our present military intentions to the enemy. About the secon - the political possibilities - I should like only to say the following: Europe's blindness will one day come to a sudden end and thereby bring Germany psychological help and political possibilities arising therefrom. If we ourselves give ourselves up before this, it will be too late for these possibilities. Then we will be dead, and they will no longer be of any use. I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the navy :-

1. That they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger the following of this path. They have been given the handling of this work by the Führer's OKW/WFST Qu II 0011538 top secret of the 23. 9. 44. I demand from Senior Commanders that they should take just as ruthless action against any commander who does not do his military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral strength to occupy his position as a leader in this

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sense, he must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not burdened with any tasks as a leader.

2. The honour of our flag on board is holy to us. No one thinks of surrendering his ship. Better go down honourably. That goes without saying for us all. That is just how we behaved in the fighting on land. If it comes to having to defend our naval bases, the place will, according to the Führer's order, be defended to the last man. The watchword will then be - death or victory. Any commander who lacks the moral strength for this and is weakening, must according to the Führer's order, consult his men and hand over command to harder fighters.

3. The Navy will fight to the end. In days to come, posterity will judge it according to its bearing at the biggest crisis in this war. The same goes also for every individual. Former deeds are wiped out if he fails at the decisive hour, to endure which he became a soldier. Or does anyone believe that the enemy respects someone who capitulates in a cowardly manner? He is in fact welcome to him, but is then despised and treated accordingly.

4. Let us be clear about the fact that we have to be the exponents of our people's will to live. Just like the leadership of the state, we must not tire, even if parts of our people were to become, or are, soft, otherwise we would be bad leaders. If someone proves to me that by resignation something better occurs or is achieved, I shall immediately sink into apathy. Till then, however, I shall act according to the exact opposite.

5. Thus the unanimous will to fight of our Navy must continue in existence. That is the best contribution we can make to the turning of the present crisis.

A situation is never such that it can not be improved by a heroic attitude. It is certain that any contrary attitude means dissolution and with it chaos and inextinguishable dishonour.

C - in - C. Navy.

Enclosure 2.

Secret Baltic order of the day No. 19 of the 19. 4. 45.

III. Promotion of under-officers and men who have shown themselves to be personalities in warfare.

(C-in-C. Navy, Chief Mar. Wehr./Tr. 1 4780 secret of the 10.3.45)

The C-in-C. Navy has ordered:

I desire that the leaders of units responsible for ratings and the flotilla commanders and other commanders superior to them should interest themselves more in the promotion of those under-officers and men who have shown in special situations in the war that, thanks to their inner attitude and firmness, by energy and inner drive, - in short, owing to their gifts of personality - they are capable of taking right decisions independently and of carrying them out without wavering in their aim and with willing acceptance of responsibility.

An example: in a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser "Cormorau" in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown that he is fitted to be a leader.

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There are more men like that in the Navy. They show themselves to be willing to make decisions and to act rightly in the mastering of difficult situations as soon as they are left to their own resources. They thus show their inner value.

These men are to be recommended immediately for training for posts as under-officers or officers. I expect from all the commanding officers designated, rapid and energetic measures.

Enclosure 3.

Secret decree of Grand Admiral Doenitz.

SSD MBKO 6611 7.4. 1315

Re: Plan "Paula" East.

pp.....

We men of the Navy know how we have to act. Our military duty, which we carry out without swerving, whatever may happen to the left and right of us and around us, leaves us standing brave, hard and faithful like a rock of resistance.

Anyone who does not act like this is a cowardly scoundrel, and must be hanged and a placard tied to him: "Here hangs a traitor who contributed by his low cowardice to German women and children dying, instead of protecting them like a man.

C-in-C. Navy.

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